The Construction of Discrimination Against the Shi'a Community in Sampang, Madura: A Religious Structural Violence Perspective

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Abstrak: Paper ini mengkaji kekerasan terhadap komunitas Syiah di Sampang, Madura yang menjadi isu laten dan sangat mungkin akan terjadi di tempat dan waktu yang lain. Paper ini mengeksplorasi produksi media dalam masyarakat yang mengkonstruksi dan mendiskriminasi minoritas agama serta peran otoritas keagamaan di Sampang, Madura. Paper ini didasarkan pada penelitian kualitatif melalui studi kepustakaan dan empiris dengan memanfaatkan teori Johan Galtung dan memadukannya dengan analisis wacana kritis Norman Fairclough. Paper ini menemukan bahwa wacana terhadap Syi'ah sebagai sistem kepercayaan sesat di Sampang Madura diproduksi oleh media. Otoritas agama mengambil cukup peran untuk mendukung dan menyebarkan wacana ini ke berbagai kelompok sosial. Dari kajian yang telah dilakukan juga ditemukan bahwa terdapat kekerasan kultural dan struktural terhadap komunitas Syi'ah di Sampang Madura dalam wujud diskriminasi, intimidasi dan kekerasan.

Kata kunci: *Komunitas Syi'ah; Sampang, diskriminasi; kekerasan struktural; otoritas keagamaan*

Abstract: The paper examines the violence against the Shi'a community in Sampang, Madura. It is a latent issue and is highly likely to occur in different contexts. The paper also explores media production in the society that constructs and discriminates against religious minorities and the role of religious authorities in Sampang, Madura. The paper is mainly based on qualitative research through literature and empirical studies, utilizing Johan Galtung's triangulation of violence theory and Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis. The results indicate that the discourse on Shi'a as a dissenting group in Sampang, Madura, is produced by the media. Religious authorities play an essential role in supporting and spreading the discourse to various social groups. The study also highlights cultural and structural acts of violence to the Shi'a community in Sampang through discrimination, intimidation, and violence.

Keywords: *Shi'a community; Sampang; discrimination, structural violence; religious authority*

Introduction

The social conflict between the Sunni and Shi'a religious communities in Sampang, Madura, was triggered by many factors, for instance, ideology, economics, politics, and social problem.[1] Religious and state authorities play their roles in the conflict configuration. As the main religious authority, the MUI's Fatwa plays a significant role in the justification of violence against the Shi'a community in Sampang. Media expresses both religious authority and state authority in communicating with one another.

The media currently functions not only to convey various information to the public but also to influence and promote the ideology of a group of people for constructing positive discourse in society. Discourse on and practices of the Shi'a community portrayed by the media have constructed the society's opinion about Shi'a as a dissenting ideology. The violence in the Shi'a community, such as structural and cultural violence, potentially impacts the construction of media against the Shi'a community.

Sampang society is mostly Sunni. The emergence of the Shi'a community as a social group became a highly-discussed intra-faith clash issue in Indonesia. The different ideologies and beliefs between the two Muslim groups contesting their religious activity, worldview, and tradition in the community have caused conflicts. The Shi'a community has become vulnerable and targeted by most Sunni in Indonesia. The Sunni majority has repeatedly committed intimidation of the Shi'as in the country.[2]

The current development of digital media has opened up a new space for Shi'a groups to express themselves in public.[3] New media, like the internet and social media (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Telegram) have effectively shaped public view points. The newspaper also takes a role in the process of the conflict and violence against Shi'as in Sampang. However, local media contributes to giving

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[1] I conducted in-depth interview to the chairperson of MUI Sampang Regency on 26 March 2018.

[2] Achmah Ida, "Cyberspace and Sectarianism in Indonesia: The Rise of Shia Media and Anti-Shia Online Movements," *Jurnal Komunikasi Islam* 06, no. 02 (2016): 1-19.

[3] Ida.

balance information about the religious practice of the Shi'a community that does not differ from the common Sunni religious practice.[4]

I will highlight some points in this paper; the first is the interconnection between the religious authority and media in the emergence of conflict and violence in the Shi'a community. Next, how the conflict and violence in the Shi'a community are emerging. In this study, I utilize the Johan Galtung theory on the triangulation of violence. It covers direct or physical violence, indirect violence (structural violence), and cultural violence.[5] I employ critical discourse analysis to support the theory to investigate the interconnection between religious authority and the emergence of violence.

Galtung's triangulation of violence fruitfully captures the forms of violence (i.e., direct, indirect, and cultural) in the Shi'a community in Sampang, Madura. In particular, cultural violence is manifested by stereotyping, prejudicing, discrimination, and others. According to Galtung, cultural violence is similar to a land rupture in an earthquake based on a geological phenomenon. At the same time, Fairclough's critical discourse analysis[6] effectively portrays the interconnection between the emerging conflict and the role of religious authority in constructing the understanding through the media in Sampang, Madura.

To illustrate the conflict in the two communities in Sampang, Sunni-Shi'a, I describe the social conflict that arose seven years ago. After the conflict, one of them became an internally displaced community in Sidoarjo. Violence and discrimination occurred in the "Puspo Agro" Sidoarjo refugee camp. The freedom of religious expression in the new area is still on the condition of faith with fear, as they still struggle to propose to the government to repatriate to their homeland in Sampang.[7]

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[4] I conducted an interview with Zamakhsyari, a journalist in Sampang, by phone on 25 August 2019.

[5] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means, Peace, Conflict, Development, and civilization* (Oslo: Sage Publication, 1996), 1–19.

[6] Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (UK: Polity Press, 1992).

[7] I conducted an interview with Tajul Muluk in the camp of Puspo Agro Sidoarjo, East Java, 21 March 2018, 09.15 AM.

Portrait of Discrimination against Shi'a community in Sampang

In Indonesia, the social conflict between Sunni-Shi'a is intertwined with the Shi'a communities' worldwide experience.[8] Firstly, the derivation of conflict Sunni-Shi'a in the Middle East through local agents whose Islamic movements are connected with the Middle Eastern Islamic movement. Secondly, Sunnis and Shi'as have formed religious communities with fixed boundaries, with limited disguised and obscured. For instance, in Bangil, Pasuruan, there is YAPI, a large Shi'a pesantren (Islamic boarding school). The pesantren is practically the institutionalization of the Indonesian Shi'a. The existence of this pesantren is the continued episodes of Shi'a cultural propaganda. Institutionalization is a common practice since Sunni Islam has been organized itself for centuries as the major Islamic mass organization. Shi'a institutionalization can be observed in IJABI (*Ikatan Jama'ah Ahlul Bait Indonesia*/Association of Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia) by Jalaluddin Rahmat in 2006.[9]

Initial conflict departs from the children of Kiai Makmun, who have different beliefs. Sunni affiliations among Kiai Makmun's children are Rois Budur, Fatimah, Kulsum, and Ahmad. On the other hand, Tajul Muluk, Iklil, and Hani are closely affiliated to Shi'a. The conflict starts from different beliefs in the family and widens in communities in Sampang as each of Kiai Makmun's children is fighting for influence over the communities. The Sunnis feel threatened by the strengthening Shi'a movement since it will interfere with the interests of the Sunni majority in Sampang. Pruitt and Rubin argue that there are contestation, competition, and conflict within the society.[10] As a minority, the Shi'as work harder to survive. Additionally, Tajul Muluk aims to spread Shi'a teachings openly. On the other hand, the Sunni community feels concerned about the

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[8] Ali Muhtarom, *Ideologi dan Lemabag Pendidikan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia Kontestasi, Aktor, dan Jaringan* (Yogyakarta: Zahir Publishing, 2019).

[9] Wakhid Sugiyarto, *Ikatan Jama'ah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI) di Jawa Barat, in Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid (ed.), Kasus-Kasus Aliran/ Paham Keagamaan Aktual di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Puslitbang Keagamaan DEPAG RI, 2009).

[10] Ihsan Ali Fauzi, "Ambivalensi Sebagai Peluang, Agama, Kekerasan, Upaya Perdamaian-perdamaian," *Religio: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama* 3, no. 1 (2013): 40.

growth of the Shi'as. They get uneasy that the Shi'a is growing in number and has become a major ideology in Sampang.

The conflict and violence between the Sunni and Shi'a communities started from a family-level conflict and developed into community-level conflict. The conflict occurs because of different interests between individuals and groups in society.[11] Furthermore, it worsens by the discrimination against the Shi'a community in various life aspects. Discrimination used in this context refers to the Indonesian constitution 1999 number 39 (Constitution Number 39/1999) Verse 3 Point 1 "Discrimination is every restriction of movement, abuse, structural or cultural expulsion/banishment based on the human difference from a belief system, race, economic group, political interest, *mazhab* or religious thought that possibly affects the decrease of rights, social legitimation, deviation, using human rights and also basic freedom for action, political, economic, social and cultural life, personally or in a community."

The Shi'a community has become a minority in Indonesia for decades. Minority means a group with no or little power because of differences in the racial belief system. In addition, it loses its rights because of stigmatization and discrimination. The discrimination appears due to unequal views and opinions in society.[12] Shi'a is a minority[13] because it is smaller than Sunni in the number of followers, political power, and social action.

In general, discrimination against the Shi'a community emerges on two levels. The first is sociological judgment. It exists when a group of people opposed to Shi'a teachings creates stereotypes and stigma of Shi'a followers as deviants. The second is theological judgment. MUI *fatwa* can be classified into this level. MUI's fatwa previously acted as a legal thought of Muslim jurists, yet

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[11] Faturochman Faturochman, *Keadilan Perspektif Psikologi Sosial* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2015).

[12] George A. Theodorson dan Achilles G Theodorson, *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology: The Concepts and Terminology of Sociology and Related Disciplines* (New York: Barnes and Noble Book, 1979).

[13] Zaitun Abdilah dan Indra Wijaya, *Problem Keadilan Bermadzhab Indonesia* (Jakarta: Lentera Hukum Indonesia, 2014).

it transforms from morally to legally binding regulation, similar to positive law, to justify violence and discrimination.

MUI's Fatwa against Shi'a Community in Sampang

MUI's fatwa has become a theological judgment, as I find in two of the MUI's fatwas, both at national and regional levels in Sampang. It was firstly released in March 1984. The fatwa is different from the fatwa released in Sampang regency and East Java Province, released in January 2012. The MUI's fatwa has different wordings than those released in Sampang and East Java at the national level. The national fatwa only recommends all Muslims be aware of the development of Shi'a teachings in Indonesia as the teachings have some basic differences from the Sunni ones.

The first basic difference is that Shi'a teachings ignore the prophet *sunna* (*ḥadīs*), which Ahl al-Bait does not teach. On the other hand, *Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* allows it, as long as the tradition (*ḥadīs*) properly qualifies the prophetic science tradition ('*ilm musṭalah ḥadīs*). Secondly, Shi'a teachings argue that the "leader (*Imām*) is a holy man (*ma'sūm*)." In *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* teachings believe that leader (*Imām*) is common people's potential for wrong conduct. Thirdly, Shi'a teachings do not receive the consensus (*ijmā'*) without any *Imām* enrollment." *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* can accept the consensus (*ijmā'*); without requiring or involving "Imam." Next, Shi'a teachings believe that conducting government leadership is one of Islam's pillars (*arkān*). In contrast, Sunni teachings argue that public welfare is the orientation of *imamah,* which is mainly to protect Islamic teachings and the *umma*'s interests. Finally, in general, Shi'a communities do not acknowledge the leadership of Abu Bakar Siddiq, Umar bin Khattab, and Usman bin Affan. On the other hand, *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* acknowledges all four leaders (*khalīfa*).

In terms of the difference in *imamah* (government), MUI urges Indonesian Muslims who believe in *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* to be aware of the possibilities of Shi'a ideology's influences."[14] At

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[14] See Hijrah Saputra et.al. (eds), *Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia sejak 1975* (Jakarta: PT. Erlangga, 2011), p. 46. For examining other *fatwa* about Shi'a, especially on *mut'ah* marriage. The MUI *fatwa* on *mut'ah* appears in 1997. This *fatwa* resembles the Islamic jurisprudence rather than theological aspect.

about the same time, MUI Sampang's fatwa released a fatwa different in wording from the national one. The basic difference between the fatwas is the term Shi'a. MUI Sampang used "Tajul Muluk's teaching" instead of "Shi'a," essentially misguided. MUI Sampang defended using the term to localize the issue. Thus, the fatwa targets Tajul Muluk instead of the Shi'a community.[15] In contrast, MUI East Java's fatwa decreed to Muslims to support the decisions of MUI at the local level on Shi'a teachings (in particular, on *Imāmiyyah Iṡna Asyariyah*, the school of *Ahl al-Bait*, or other similar ideologies to any doctrine that is considered perverted and misleading). Also, Muslims should declare the use of *Ahl al-Bait* among Shi'a followers as a hijack of Prophet Muhammad's [PBUH] *Ahl al-Bait.*

The MUI released seven recommendations. First and foremost, Muslims should be more aware and avoid any influence or provocation by Shi'a ideology, especially on Shi'a's *Iṡna Asyariyah*, *Ahl al-Bait,* or similar terms. Next, Muslims should not provoke anarchism as it does not exist in Islamic teachings. Third, the local or national government does not allow Shi'a ideology in Indonesia because most Indonesian Muslims believe in *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah.* Thus, the engagements of Shi'a ideology may interfere with the nation's unity. Fourth, the government can do vital actions by regulating or prohibiting Shi'a activities, including institutions related to the ideology. Fifth, the government should address and utilize its power to solve existing conflicts. Intervention is not only addressing the occurring conflict but also the causes of the conflict itself, for instance, provocation in the form of terror and non-physical violence. Sixth, the government should make clear and distinct actions to handle the "perverted ideology" because it is not freedom in religious practices but an insult to the religion itself. Seventh, MUI chairpersons must strengthen their fatwas on Shi'a (especially on *Iṡna Asyariyah* or institutions under *Ahl al-Bait*) and any similar doctrine. Thus, the fatwas should be declared nationally.[16] In illustrating the MUI fatwa on the Shi'a community in Sampang, Figure 1 describes a

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[15] I conducted an interview to Bukhori Ma'shum (the Chairperson of MUI Sampang Regency) in his house, on 26 March 2018.

[16] MUI *Fatwa* 2012 of East Java, No: Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/I/2012 about the dissenting Shi'a.

roadmap for producing the fatwa against the Shi'a community in Sampang.

Figure 1:

Roadmap on the Production of Fatwa against Shi'a Community in Sampang

MUI in its central and Sampang regency office produce fatwas with different enunciation in rejecting Shi'a ideology. Initially, the fatwa from central MUI uses 'soft diction' to reject the ideology, for instance, "to be careful on the widespread Shi'a." However, MUI in Sampang regency applies its fatwa on Tajul Muluk instead of using it to stand against Shi'a. The fatwa limits the problem to a particular person. Afterward, the MUI of East Java Province issued a fatwa with powerful and more direct terms mentioning "Shi'a is a perverted teaching." Additionally, the first fatwa issued by the central MUI does not include the prohibition of violence and discrimination against Shi'a. However, the latter includes violence prohibition and conflict prevention between Sunni and Shi'a communities. Hence, the earlier fatwa is more on recommendations for Muslims to increase their awareness of the growing interest in Shi'a teachings in Indonesia. Yet, the latter aims directly to prohibit violence.

The fatwas in both central and regional MUI offices aim to protect the major ideology from the growing minor one. These fatwas can legitimize violence to Shi'a followers in the community, especially in Sampang regency,[17] since the fatwas include suggestions to the local government to create a policy in regulating the growing Shi'a teachings in the society. It leads to authoritarianism and may cultivate violent potentials in various life aspects. Even though the fatwas are not the sole triggers of violence, they may source from factors like economic, political, and social jealousy in Sampang society. For example, a riot occurred in East Java in December 2011. Also, citizen houses and buildings were burnt down in May 2012. A conflict rooted in Islamic teaching (involving Shi'a and other teachings) in Jember. Furthermore, hundreds of people attacked the Shi'a community in Sampang in August 2012.[18] These violent acts prove that discrimination against Muslim minorities still occurs in society.[19]

Suzeno asserts that religious minority has potentially become objects of violence. For instance, many people during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency became internally displaced persons or communities from their homes. As a result, they were

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[17] Ahmad Mukhsin, "A Hermeneutical Analysis on Fatwa of the Council of Indonesian Ulama Dealing with Discriminating Shia in Indonesia," *Madania: Jurnal Kajian Keislaman* 23, no. 1 (2019): 33–46.

[18] *Ibid.* Compare with the paper of Robitul Firdaus, "Paham dan Gerakan Syi"ah di Indonesia" (paper on Islamic Studies Forum for Indonesia (ISFI), 21 December 2012, in International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) Gombak, Selangor), p. 11. See also "Polri Dianggap Lalai pada Kasus Sampang", http://www.suarapembaruan.com/home/polri-   dianggap-lalai-pada-kasus-sampang/23898 and "Tentara Dekati Ulama Cegah Kasus Sampang Terjadi di Jabar," http://www.suarapembaruan.com/home/tentara-dekati-ulama-   cegah-kasus-sampang-terjadi-di-jabar/23935.

[19] "Bupati: Relokasi Warga Shi'a ke luar Madura Realistis," http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2013/05/130508_Shi'a_sampang.shtml accessed on 13 June 2013. See also "Relokasi Kelompok Minoritas Tidak Tepat," http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/10/121024_hakminoritas.shtml and Wayan Agus Purnomo, "Shi'a Sampang Mengadu ke DPR Menolak Relokasi".

suffering in their refugee camps.[20] However, a religious minority in this paper refers to power instead of the number. The majority's hegemony in different religions or even the same religion with different schools (like Sunni and Shi'a) comes from the power itself. The primary issue is the distribution of power, e.g., political, economic, and social rights, which is still an imbalance.[21] This imbalance relationship can lead to authoritarianism, including the misappropriation of fatwas.[22]

Religious and structural violence against the Shi'a community in Sampang manifests power that produces the knowledge contestation on religion and politics. It also illustrates the gaining power between political actors and religious leaders in the local context. Although the MUI's *Fatwa* in East Java appears later than the violence to the Shi'a community in Sampang, I argue that this MUI office's fatwa contributes to justifying the violence itself.

The main cause of violence to the Shi'a community is differences in religious practices, especially on *aqida* and *fiqh*. Later on, fellow Muslims started stereotyping and prejudicing them. Also, in terms of politics, in Indonesia, MUI was historically designed in the New Order era to issue a *fatwa* against the Shi'a movement in 1984. Its basic argument was to create political stability. The fatwa states that Shi'a's commitment to government (*imāmah*) is an essential religious principle. At the same time, the Sunni group argues that government leadership aims to implement Islamic teachings and public interests. In contrast, the Shi'a movement targets a government leadership based on their thought (*imāmah*). Thus, MUI issues *fatwa* by suggesting the Muslim community, especially the Sunni as a majority, increase awareness of the growing Shi'a doctrine.

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[20] Abdilah dan Wijaya, *Problem Keadilan Bermadzhab Indonesia.*

[21] Dennis Toombs, *Power: Why We Want It and What To Do with It*, (Promotheus Books, 2016), p. 85. Toombs explores human behavior in terms of power in all manifestations in a wider spectrum. He examines the subtle dynamics of power in interpersonal relationship.

[22] M Baihaqi Fadhlil Wafi, Nuzula Ilhami, dan Taufiqurohman Taufiqurohman, "Transformasi Perilaku Beragama Masyarakat Muslim Kontemporer: Fenomena Al-Qur'an di Era Digital," *IN RIGHT: Jurnal Agama dan Hak Azazi Manusia* 11, no. 1 (2022): 39–54.

Next is the economic factor that emerges in the Shi'a community in Sampang, Madura. When the maulid (Prophet Muhammad's birth) celebration invites some local Kiai (Muslim scholars), there is a competition between religious leaders. Generally, people will offer help and pay the *kyai* in every *maulid* celebration. Thus, people with lower incomes prefer joining *Muhammadiyah* or Shi'a to avoid paying some money as a part of the celebration requirements. Finally, a social gap occurs similar to the aforementioned economic issue. It occurs in Sampang since there is a contestation among local religious leaders. The social gap creates discrimination, especially among the Shi'a community as a minority in the regency.[23] Violence against the Shi'a community in Sampang results from social resentment between *kiai lokal* (local religious leader) and Shi'a religious leaders.

The MUI's *fatwa* on the Shi'a community can be classified as oppression or authoritarianism in terms of victimization, threat, attacking and destruction, forced-internal displaced community, excluded from other communities, intimidation and terror, no law enforcement protection, and civil rights violation. Oppression of the Shi'a community varies and mainly depends on the conflict escalation.

## The Role of Media in the Sunni-Shi'a Conflict in Sampang

The religious subtleties and ideological conflict occurred on August 26, 2012, in Sampang, highlighted by various media coverage. Besides, the conflict was a form of oppression from the Sunni to Shi'a followers as the major group. Therefore, the conflict tends to be religious violence[24] rather than other factors. However, the conflict could have been triggered by several non-religious factors, such as personal, family, political, and social resentment. The riot, which resulted in one death, multiple injuries, and 47 burned houses on the Shi'a community's side, made headlines in Indonesian and foreign

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[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror mandated by God," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997): 16–23.

media (e.g., BBC, VOA, and CNN).[25] After broadcast news coverage, the conflict and violence against the Shi'a minority in Sampang became an international issue. At the local level, there is "community media", which distributed stickers that framed the Shi'a community as a dissenting group. Before the incident (August to December 2012), several media broadcasted the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Sampang.[26] It still carried on details on the incident, for example, the incident chronology, the perpetrators' detainment (especially those who burned down the Shi'a followers' houses), and the displacement of the Shi'a community to the Wijaya Kusuma sports facility in Sampang. Figure 2 illustrates the construction process of discourse on the Shi'a community as a dissenting group shaped by social practice through the MUI's fatwa and social media.

Figure 2:

Texts (Written/ Spoken) Expressed through utterances.
For example: Shi`a is a heretical sect; Shi`a is similar to a cancer in the human body.

Power/Constitutive

Ideology/Constitutive

Hegemony/Constitiveve

Discursive Practice: The emerging fatwa on Tajul Muluk's doctrine in Sampang, fatwa against Shi`a in East Java Province, Governor Regulation No. 55/2012, the decision of the judge .481/Pid./2012/Pt. Surabaya

Text Production: (A demand from society to protect the ideology of the Sunni majority.

Text Distribution: (media of religious teaching, Islamic teachings, leaflets, books, short text messages, group discussion, mediation and other media.

Text Consumption: The emerging written and unwritten policy: Positivisation of Fatwa through governor regulation of East Java and the decision of judges in Surabaya High Court, the relocation of Shi`i in Sampang.

Dialectic

Dialectic

Social Practice: Conflict, violence, discrimination, genocide, relocation, and other social practices.

...Konflik Sampang (Studi ekonomi Politik Media Tentang Konflik S... Sampang). For ...
https://w... ...6/JURNALIS...
Studi Ek... ...ang tentang K...
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... ...ce and Sectarianism in Indonesia: The Rise of Shia Medi... ...ovements," in ...

The Construction Process of Discourse on Shi'a Community as a Dissenting Group

The chronology of the attack on the Shi'a Community by Sunni followers was reported by Tempo.co, Antaranews.com, Detik.com, Kompas.com, and other national media. Similar news was broadcasted in several local newspapers in Madura, e.g., *Radar Madura* Daily Newspaper, *Kabar Madura,* and MediaMadura.com. Like Tempo.co and Kompas.com, national media mostly covered stories about the Sunni-Shi'a conflict on August 26, 2012. They also reported the importance of recognizing the minority existence, restoring the rights of Shi'a followers, and the state's ineffective role in providing security which has particularly driven out the Shi'a community. On August 28, 2012, Tempo.co reported "Government Version of Sampang Conflict Solution." The news released a statement from Suryadharma Ali, the Minister of Religion, who mentioned that the government was trying to restore the sense of security among Sampang residents after the riot. In particular, the Shi'a community in Sampang was forced to evacuate.[27] The news also explained that the roots of the conflict mainly came from a family

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[27] https://nasional.tempo.co/read/426083/solusi-konflik-sampang-versi-pemerintah.

dispute. Suryadharma Ali also stated that dialogue is one of the efforts to create peace and understanding between the two communities.[28]

Kompas.com covered about 330 stories on the Sunni-Shi'a conflict from 2012 to 2018. One of them is "The Key to Sampang's Conflict Settlement is in Kyai Madura." The news was reported by Yatimul Ainun on September 1, 2012, and contained a comment from Hasyim Muzadi, the former Head of the Executive Board of Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU). The late Hasyim Muzadi stated that the Sampang case occurred due to a gap in understanding; therefore, the ones that could resolve the conflict were the Madura *ulama* (religious leaders) themselves. Before the incident, Kompas.com had reported the potential conflict in Sampang; however, it did not specifically mention the Sunni-Shi'a dispute. Kompas.com interviewed Gamawan Fauzi, Minister of Home Affairs, and reported that the source of the conflict was the Shi'a community. The news was sourced from KH Abdusshomad Buchori, the chairperson of the MUI office in East Java. Local Madura media partly justified and illustrated that the Shi'a community in Sampang is considered blasphemous. Hence, the media tended to cover news that cornered the Shi'a community, for instance, in an article entitled "Twenty-three Shi'a followers in Sampang return to Sunni" by the maduracorner.com on November 3, 2012. The online media, which was based in Bangkalan Regency, reported eight families or twenty-three Shia followers in Blu'uran village, Karang Penang sub-district, Sampang Regency, who still lived in the conflict location had converted back to *Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (Sunni teaching).[29] Maduracorner.com also explained that Shahada recitation led by KH preceded the convert ceremony. Lutfi Lah Ridwan continued by reading the pledge that they would no longer practice Shi'a teachings. Similar news was also reported by Beritajatim.com, an East Java regional online media based in

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[28]   https://nasional.tempo.co/read/426136/menag-dialog-solusi-cepat-ricuh-sampang-madura.

[29]   http://www.maduracorner.com/23-orang-penganut-syiah-sampang-kembali-ke-sunni/

Surabaya.[30] Beritajatim.com reported the Shi'a followers who returned to Sunni teachings, and it was not the first. On October 24, 2012, fifteen families were former Shi'a followers living in Karang Gayam village, Omben sub-district, and had also reverted to *Ahl as-Sunna wa al-Jama'ah*.

Shoemaker and Reese classify several factors which influence the newsroom's decision-making. They identify the factors as personal, media routines, level of organization, media extra, and ideology. First of all, personal factors deal with individual backgrounds, such as gender, age, and religion. These factors have affected the broadcasted news. Educational background or orientation toward particular political parties can also influence professionalism in media reporting.[31] Secondly, media routines determine the news's mechanism and process. Each media has its news measurement, good news characteristics, or news eligibility criteria. The routines occur daily and have become a standard operating procedure for media executives. This media routine also relates to the mechanism by which news is formed, when there is an important event that has to be covered, how the assignment is delegated, through the process and hand of whoever writes before reaching the printing process, who is the author, who is the editor, and so on.

Next, the level of organization is related to the media's organizational structure, which hypothetically influences reporting. The editor-in-chief and journalists are not the only members of a news organization. Each component in a media organization may have its interests; for example, there are editorial desks, marketing desks, advertising desks, circulation desks, and general desks in a media organization. Each of these divisions may not always be in

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[30] I conducted an interview by phone with Zamakhsyari on 24 August 2019. He mentioned that the media try to report in a balance situation. For instance, he illustrated *Suara Jatim* which explained that a religious practice is similar to the religious practice of the Sunni community. It endorses decreasing resistance among them.

[31] Abd. Aziz, "Jurnalis di Konflik Sampang," at 14-16. Read more at https://www.academia.edu/36413826/JURNALIS_DI_KONFLIK_SAMPANG_ Studi_Ekonomi_Politik_Media_tentang_tentang_Konflik_Sunni-_Syiah_di_Kabupaten_Sampang.

line. They have different objectives, goals, and strategies to achieve targets. The editorial desk, for example, aims at particular news to be broadcasted; however, the circulation desk may ask for other news to be highlighted for it increases sales. Aside from having different elements, every news organization also has its own organizational goals and philosophies; these elements influence how its journalists behave and events that should be presented via its newsroom.

Followingly, media extra is related to surrounding factors outside the media. Things around the media organization, in many cases, affect media coverage. For instance, the news resource may not be in a neutral position; it may have an interest in it. Also, media funding resources can make the media compromise, particularly to deal with sustainability. The interest may be closely related to broadcasting demand from society. Next are external elements, like, the government and company environment. Finally, the media's ideology works as a framework of thought or individual preferences to frame reality and how to deal with it. The media's ideology is considered abstract since it deals with one's conception or position in interpreting reality.

Raymond William classifies the use of media's ideology[32] into three domains: the belief system of the community, the construction of false consciousness, and the general process of production of ideas and meaning. Ideology describes the production of meaning. Thus, media and journalists consider the five factors influencing the newsroom's decision-making in producing their news, especially those portraying conflicts between Sunni- Shi'a communities in Sampang, Madura. In the meantime, Madura local media, Maduracorner.com and Beritajatim.com, tend to side with the majority group and put the Shi'a community as a dissenting group. The day-to-day tasks of journalists in Sampang are a separate consideration in maintaining the continuity of their news. In Shoemaker and Reese's terms, these journalists' tasks come to the classification of media extra.

Therefore, some of the media shape society's understanding of the Shi'a community as a dissenting group rather than reporting

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[32] Eriyanto Eriyanto, *Analisis Framing : Kontruksi, Ideologi, dan Politik Media* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011).

the positive news. The role of media has put pressure on the community in demanding religious authority and forcing the government to forbid the growing Shi'a teachings. In Fairclough's perspective, the media have produced news to shape the public opinion on the Shi'a community. They also lead the religious authority and the government to respond to the society's demand to stop the spread of Shi'as teachings in Sampang. Hence, MUI's fatwa has transformed from a moral-binding guideline to a legal-binding public policy. Based on Galtung's theory, it then shifts from cultural violence to structural violence.[33]

MUI's Influence on Local Government Policy

Muslim scholars agree that MUI's fatwa is a moral-binding guideline for Muslims in Indonesia. On the other hand, public policy is a legal-binding regulation made by political authority or government since law enforcers will implement it. Society in Madura is mechanically built upon religious authorities[34] through the influence of *kyai lokal* (local religious leaders). The fatwa commission of MUI in Sampang regency is part of religious authority; however, the government that designs the public policy is part of state authority. Society in Madura is generally obedient; therefore, they generally conform to the government. As in this case, the government is expected to provide a resolution to the case of the Shi'a community in Sampang.

The fatwa often incorporates suggestions or recommendations for the local government to issue a public policy at the local level to strengthen the MUI's fatwa with dialectic political power. Therefore, it is in line with the case of the Shi'a community in Sampang and Sidoarjo. The fatwa suggests and recommends local governments issue a local public policy in the Sampang regency and East Java province. It proves that the fatwa has a role in the government. The Sampang government took the MUI Sampang's fatwa and used it during Tajul Muluk's trial in the Sampang State

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[33] Johan Galtung, Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means,* pp. 1-9.

[34] Luthfi Asysyaukani, "Fatwa and violence in Indonesia," *Journal of Religion and Society* 11 (2019): 1–29.

Court, which claimed him as a religious blasphemy actor.[35] The court decision punished Tajul Muluk for two years in prison and was supported by the East Java High Court. The MUI Sampang's fatwa became a consideration to issue the verdict against Tajul Muluk. The government of East Java later applied the fatwa via governor's regulation No. 55/2012. The regulation offers the authority to each religion, including MUI, to decide on any dissenting religious teachings.

I highlight in my conclusion that religious and state authorities need one another to influence and receive legitimation in society. The argument goes with the culture of East Java, especially in Sampang, Madura. For example, the kiai has a strategic position in the mechanical community. However, they have limited power in the context of the law. *Kiai* also needs the government to ensure that the state can accommodate *kiai*'s aspirations to their followers. Simultaneously, the state issues public policies which require the community's validity. Thus, *kiai* has significant power in the community, which often becomes the government's consideration in issuing state policies. When the fatwa transforms from a moral-binding guideline to a legal-binding public policy applied to all citizens, the politicization of the fatwa occurs.

The state's policy on the Shi'a community implies that the minority will be exiled from its homeland. For the community, the policy has surely brought many consequences, especially the community's marginalization. Some of the consequences are internally displaced communities and unequal position of the community in all life aspects. A real example of marginalization to the Shi'a community is the state relocates it from its homeland. It was forcefully relocated from its social and cultural roots. The Shi'a community's relocation process can also be defined as structural violence. When the religious and state authorities cooperate to protect the majority from the threat of minority, it is labeled as structural power, different from cultural violence. Structural violence

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[35] Wahyudi Akmaliah, "Kekerasan dan Pengusiran Atas Nama Agama Pasca Rejim Orde Baru: Studi Kasus Konflik Syi'ah Sampang.," *Maarif: Arus Pemikiran Islam dan Sosial* 10, no. 2 (2015): 221–42.

works more sophisticatedly through religious instruments, such as fatwa, and state instruments via public policy and other regulations.

Conclusion

There is an interconnectedness between religious authority, media, and the emerging violence in the Shi'a community in Sampang, Madura. The discourse on the Shi'a community as a dissenting group in the media is the religious discourse inseparable from structural power. In this context, the MUI's fatwa is arguably powerful as it legitimates that Shi'a is dissenting from the major Islamic teachings. Thus, the MUI's fatwa on Shi'a is a form of authoritarianism and has discriminated against the Shi'a community in Sampang, Madura. Fatwa as a religious discourse constructs public opinion, especially in Sampang. The mainstreaming of religious discourse through the media, e.g., newspapers, television, magazines, and online websites, has discriminated against the Shi'a community. The fatwa has drawn the local government to issue a public policy via government and non-government regulations to exclude the Shi'a community from Sampang. The violence that occurred to the Shi'a community is also rooted in cultural violence, such as social discrimination, intimidation, stereotyping, and structural violence. In addition, mass media has strengthened this violence.

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