

Prophetic Practice and Legal Significance: Al-Ghazālī's Critique of Textualism in al-Mankhūl

Landy Trisna Abdurrahman,* Ahmad Yani Anshori,**

*UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta

** UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta

Email: 20300011046@student.uin-suka.ac.id

Abstrak: The methodological framework proposed by al-Ghazali in al-Mankhūl min Ta'liqātīl Uṣūl offers a balanced perspective on the Prophet's conduct by classifying his actions according to the objectives of the Sharia (*maqāṣid al-Sharia*), contextual indicators (*qarīnah*), and their relation to local custom ('urf). This classification enables a clear distinction between actions that are normatively binding and those that reflect the socio-cultural practices of the 7th-century Prophetic era. Such an approach avoids the extremes of literalism, which absolutizes all Prophetic behavior as obligatory, and relativism, which dismisses the normative dimension of the Sharia by reducing the Prophet's conduct to mere socio-cultural products. The analysis is reinforced by an in-depth discussion of the roles of 'urf and *maṣlaḥah* as instruments that bridge the textual tradition with social realities. 'Urf helps identify local and temporal elements within the Prophet's actions, while *maṣlaḥah* ensures that legal adaptations remain oriented toward recognized benefits under the Sharia. This study adopts a qualitative, library-based research method, examining al-Mankhūl both textually and contextually, and reassessing the connection between al-Ghazali's methodological framework and the practice of legal derivation (*istinbat al-hukm*). The critique of textualism and hadith-centrism underscores the urgency of this approach, as both tendencies risk neglecting social context and the aims of public welfare. The findings show that al-Ghazali's methodology integrates theological, legal-theoretical, and jurisprudential dimensions into a unified epistemic structure, paving the way for an Islamic legal methodology that is more responsive to contemporary social dynamics while maintaining normative legitimacy, and is relevant for the development of fatwas and religious policy.

Keywords: Prophetic Practice; Legal Significance; al-Ghazālī; al-Mankhūl

Abstract: Kerangka metodologis yang ditawarkan al-Ghazali dalam al-Mankhūl min Ta'liqātīl Uṣūl memberikan cara pandang yang proporsional terhadap perilaku Nabi dengan mengklasifikasikan tindakan-tindakannya berdasarkan tujuan-tujuan syariat, *qarīnah* (keterangan) konteks, serta keterkaitannya dengan 'urf (lokalitas).

Melalui klasifikasi ini, dimungkinkan pemisahan antara tindakan yang bersifat normatif mengikat dan tindakan yang merefleksikan kebiasaan sosial-budaya pada masa Kenabian (Abad 7 Masehi), sehingga terhindar dari jebakan literalisme yang memutlakkan seluruh perilaku Nabi menjadi wajib diikuti, atau bahkan relativisme yang menanggalkan dimensi normatif syariat – karena anggapan perilaku Nabi adalah sebatas produk sosial-budaya. Analisis ini diperkuat dengan pembahasan mendalam mengenai peran *‘urf* dan *maṣlaḥah* sebagai instrumen yang menjembatani teks dengan realitas sosial. *‘Urf* membantu mengenali unsur-unsur lokal dan temporal dalam perilaku Nabi, sedangkan *maṣlaḥah* memastikan bahwa adaptasi hukum tetap berorientasi pada kemaslahatan yang diakomodir oleh syariat. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif berbasis studi kepustakaan, dengan menelaah al-Mankhūl secara tekstual dan kontekstual, serta meninjau ulang keterkaitan antara kerangka metodologis al-Ghazali dengan praktik istinbat hukum. Kritik terhadap tekstualisme dan hadisisme menegaskan urgensi pendekatan ini, mengingat keduanya berpotensi mengabaikan konteks sosial dan tujuan kemaslahatan. Temuan dalam artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa metodologi al-Ghazali merekatkan dimensi teologis, usul fikih, dan fikih dalam satu kesatuan epistemik, membuka ruang bagi metodologi hukum Islam yang lebih adaptif terhadap dinamika sosial kontemporer tanpa kehilangan legitimasi normatifnya, serta relevan bagi pengembangan fatwa dan kebijakan keagamaan.

Keywords: Perilaku Nabi; Signifikansi Hukum; al-Ghazālī; al-Mankhūl

Introduction

The literal imitation of the Prophet Muḥammad’s life continues to be a prominent phenomenon in the religious dynamics of contemporary Muslim societies. Many communities require their members to emulate the external aspects of the Prophet’s daily life (ranging from clothing, eating, and sleeping patterns to social interactions) under the conviction that every action of the Prophet carries spiritual merit. In Indonesia, Jamā‘ah Tabligh demonstrates this tendency through the adoption of distinctive symbols such as the jubbah, *sarwāl-qamiṣ*, *‘imamah*, perfume, *kuḥl*, and the use of the *niqāb*

among women.¹ The literal imitation of the Prophet Muḥammad's life continues to be a prominent phenomenon in the religious dynamics of contemporary Muslim societies.² While the aspiration to return to the sources of Islam cannot be dismissed, its rigid application often generates problems. In its extreme form, textualism disregards historical context, the purposes of the Sharia, and the breadth of scholarly interpretation. Moreover, modern scholars have identified a further orientation, termed ḥadīsim, which treats every hadith as a literal prescription for behavior.³ This orientation risks reducing the sunnah to mere physical imitation, as if all of the Prophet's actions were legally binding, without distinguishing between those that are *tasyri'i* (normative legislation) and those that are merely *'adī* or *jibillī* (ordinary human habits embedded in seventh-century Arabian culture). Recent studies have highlighted that one of the central challenges of textualism and hadithism lies in their neglect of contextual readings, despite the fact that the meaning of hadith is inseparable from the socio-cultural settings in which they were articulated.⁴

¹ Imron Rosyidi and Encep Dulwahab, "Komunikasi Nonverbal Jamaah Tabligh," *Communicatus: Jurnal Ilmu komunikasi* 1, no. 2 (2019): 71–88, <https://doi.org/10.15575/cjik.v1i2.5023>; Muhammad Ulul Albab Musaffa and Landy Trisna Abdurrahman, "FIKIH PAKAIAN JAMAAH TABLIGH: ANTARA DOKTRIN, IDENTITAS, DAN STRATEGI," *Harmoni* 22, no. 1 (2023): 48–69, <https://doi.org/doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v1i22.642>.

² Ahmed Meiloud, "A Conflict Between Divine Texts and Human Legal Needs?," *Islamic Africa* 7, no. 1 (2016): 81–89, <https://doi.org/10.1163/21540993-00701006>; Jonathan Crowe and Constance Y. Lee, *Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044>.

³ Rafael Yusupovich Rakhmatullin et al., "Meaning of Sunnah in Islam: Quranism vs Hadithism," *Manuscript* 14, no. 6 (2021): 1209–12, <https://doi.org/10.30853/mns210195>; Hacı Yıldız, "An Evaluation of Suhrawardi's Hadithism in the Context of His Work Awarifu'l-Maarif," *Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no. 57 (September 2022): 173–81, <https://doi.org/10.53568/yyusbed.1169185>.

⁴ Tarmizi M. Jakfar and Arifah Fitria, "Understanding Multiple Interpretations on the Hadith That Husbands Allow Wives to Have Outdoor Activities: A Study of Islamic Law Perspectives," *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Dan Hukum Islam* 5, no. 1 (2021): 210, <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v5i1.9106>; Agusni Yahya and Muslim Zainuddin, "The Interpretation of the Hadith on the Characteristics of Women and Its Implications for Islamic Law," *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Dan Hukum Islam* 5, no. 1 (2021): 276–96, <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v5i1.9593>.

This debate has in fact been addressed since the early development of *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh*. Scholars clearly differentiated between the Prophet's actions that were intended as normative rulings (*tasyrī'i*) and those that reflected customary practices, social conditions, or his personal preferences (*'ādī/jibillī*).⁵ However, such distinctions are often overlooked in contemporary calls for a return to the so-called "pure sunnah," which prioritizes external forms over substantive values. As a result, piety is frequently measured by outward markers such as the length of the beard, the type of clothing, or visible appearance, while ethical values, social justice, and communal welfare (the very core of Islamic teaching) are marginalized.

The intellectual framework of Imām Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) offers a methodologically relevant response to these issues. In *al-Mankhūl min Ta'liqāt al-Uṣūl*, Al-Ghazālī presents a detailed discussion of *sunnah fi'l-ḥayyāh* (the Prophet's actions) while critiquing the view of some hadith scholars who maintained that imitating every action of the Prophet is inherently sunnah. He identifies this claim as *ghalāṭ* (error/a mistake), insisting on the need to consider *qarīnah* (contextual indicators), *maqāṣid* (the intended objectives), and *'urf* (prevailing customs) before assigning legal value to any act. Al-Ghazālī's perspective resonates with contemporary scholarly arguments that stress rational and contextual approaches to ensure that Islamic law remains relevant to evolving social realities.⁶

This perspective is significant because it provides a framework for distinguishing between the Prophet's actions that were intended as normative legal teachings and those that merely reflected cultural habits or his personal preferences. The style of fashion in the Prophet's time, for instance, is better understood as part of the *'urf* of Arabian society

⁵ 'Ālī Jum'ah, *Tarikh Uṣūl Al-Fiqh* (Dār Al-Muqattam Linnasyri wattawzī, 2015); Subkhani Kusuma Dewi, "Otoritas Teks Sebagai Pusat Dari Praktik Umat Islam," *Jurnal Living Hadis* 1, no. 1 (2016): 197, <https://doi.org/10.14421/livinghadis.2016.1074>.

⁶ L. Ali Khan and Hisham M. Ramadan, *Contemporary Ijtihad Limits and Controversies* (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748641284.001.0001>; Ahmad Syafi'i Sulaiman Jamrozi et al., "Maqāṣid Al-Sharīa in The Study of Hadith and Its Implication for The Renewal of Islamic Law: Study on Jasser Auda's Thought," *Justicia Islamica* 19, no. 1 (2022): 74–93, <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v19i1.3269>.

rather than as a binding command of the Sharia across all eras. The same applies to types of food or daily practices, whose exemplary value arises only when they embody a dimension of *ta'abbud* (devotional worship). In other words, following the Prophet does not necessarily entail imitating outward technical details, but rather understanding the underlying objectives and benefits they convey.

In Al-Mankhūl, Al-Ghazālī further classified the Prophet's actions into four categories: (1) actions accompanied by explicit commands, which carry the status of *wājib*; (2) actions that are clearly customary and therefore do not generate a *taklīfī* ruling; (3) devotional acts not accompanied by explicit commands, which are generally considered *mandub*; and (4) actions indicating permissibility (*ibāḥah*), aimed at removing hardship in the law.⁷ The last category is particularly noteworthy, as it affirms that certain actions of the Prophet were intended to create ease for the community rather than add further obligations. Such an emphasis on flexibility resonates with the spirit of contemporary *ijtihād*, which seeks to reinterpret the texts in order to address the needs of the time.⁸

At this stage, the principles of *'urf* and *maṣlaḥah* assume a central role. *'Urf* refers to customary practices within a society that, as long as they do not contradict the Shariah, may serve as valid legal considerations.⁹ The Prophet Muhammad PBUH lived in seventh-century Arabian culture, and many of his actions were naturally aligned with its customs. Reading the sunnah without taking *'urf* into account risks binding Islam to external forms that may appear foreign in other cultural settings. Thus, reliance on *'urf* enables Muslims to emulate the Prophet at the level of values and objectives rather than mere external appearances. *Maṣlaḥah* (the pursuit of communal welfare) serves as an equally important criterion. Actions of the Prophet that yield universal benefit in matters of worship, ethics, or social life typically carry greater

⁷ Abū-Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ibn-Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, *Al-Mankhūl min Ta'liqāt al-Uṣūl*, Ṭab'a 1, ed. Nāḡī as-Suwaid (Al-Maktaba al-'Aṣriya, 2008).

⁸ Fachrizal A. Halim, "Reformulating the Madhhab in Cyberspace," *Islamic Law and Society* 22, no. 4 (2015): 413–35, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685195-00224p04>.

⁹ 'Alī Jum'ah, *Al-Madkhal ilā Dirāsati Al-Maṣāhib Al-Fiqhiyyah* (Dārussalām, 2001); Waḥbah Az-Zuhaylī, *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh Al-Ḥanafī*, 1st ed. (Dārul Al-Maktabī, 2001).

normative weight.¹⁰ Conversely, actions whose benefit is relative or limited to specific circumstances may be classified as optional (*sunnah*) or even *mubāḥ*. A case in point is the recommendation to maintain oral hygiene by using the siwāk. The underlying *maqāṣid* here concern health and ritual purity, which can be fulfilled in modern contexts through toothbrushes or other hygienic means. This principle offers flexibility in practicing the sunnah while safeguarding its essential meaning. By focusing on al-Mankhūl and the concepts of *ʿurf* and *maṣlaḥah*, this study seeks to revive a balanced methodology of Uṣūl al-Fiqh in understanding the Prophet's actions. This approach does not deny the importance of prophetic example, but stresses the need to differentiate between devotional dimensions and customary practices. In this way, the sunnah can be applied meaningfully across diverse cultural contexts, without being reduced to symbolic formalism that may hinder the reception of Islam in society.

This article will provide a descriptive account of Al-Ghazālī's views in al-Mankhūl on the classification of the Prophet's actions, followed by an exploration of the role of *ʿurf* and *maṣlaḥah* as analytical tools for distinguishing between *tasyrīʿī* sunnah and the Prophet's everyday practices. The aim is to foster a more balanced and contextual understanding, whereby the sunnah is not perceived merely as a list of technical behaviors but as a source of moral and legal inspiration that guides the Muslim community. Within Al-Ghazālī's methodological framework, the Prophet's actions are not confined to a simple dichotomy between *tasyrīʿī* and *ʿādī* (*al-muʿtādah*). Rather, they are analyzed in greater detail through indicators such as *qarīnah* and the objectives of the Sharia. His categorization encompasses actions signifying obligation (*qarīnah al-wujūb*), non-devotional habits (*al-afʿāl al-ʿadīyyah*), pure acts of worship (*taʿabbud*), acts of permissibility (*ibāḥah*), and actions requiring interpretation (*afʿāl muʿamwalāt*).¹¹ This layered model allows for the integration of *ʿurf* and *maṣlaḥah* in the interpretation of *afʿāl al-rasūl*.

¹⁰ Az-Zuhaylī, *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh Al-Ḥanafī*, Zaenuddin Mansyur, "Pembaruan Maṣlaḥah Dalam Maqāṣid Al- Sharia: Telaah Humanistik Tentang Al-Kulliyāt Al-Khamsah," *Ulumuna* 16, no. 1 (2012): 71-102., <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujs.v16i1.103>.

¹¹ Ghazzālī, *Al- Mankhūl min Taʿlīqāt al-Uṣūl*.

Recent studies indicate that debates on textualism in Islamic law continue to dominate contemporary academic discourse. Muñiz (2021) emphasizes the importance of consistency in adhering to the literal meaning of the text as a guarantee of legal certainty,¹² while Hamdeh (2021) observes the tendency of Salafī groups to prioritize textual authority over the consensus of the madhhab.¹³ Criticism is raised by Oberauer (2022), who demonstrates that the canonization process within the madhhab indeed creates doctrinal stability but simultaneously introduces methodological rigidity.¹⁴ Jamrozi et al. (2022) further underline the need for a historical–anthropological approach in uncovering the meaning of the text, particularly when addressing dynamic social realities.¹⁵ The debate between textualism and contextualism is not merely theoretical, but has direct implications for the way Muslims interpret and practice the Prophet’s sunnah in daily life. This discourse intersects with Hadithism, an approach that places the hadith at the center of legal interpretation. While textualism emphasizes the literal meaning of the Qur’an and Sunnah, hadithism highlights the purposes underlying prophetic narrations and their implications for the renewal of Islamic law.¹⁶ Despite the variety of perspectives, the majority of studies remain at the level of principle. The discourse on textualism and contextualism—as noted by Meiloud (2016) and Hosen (2019)—suggests that *ijtihad* serves as a bridge between fidelity to the text and social needs.¹⁷ Yet no operational methodological framework has thus far been developed to precisely distinguish between the Prophet’s actions that are *tasyri’i* (intended as

¹² Joaquín Rodríguez-Toubes Muñiz, “El Textualismo,” *Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía Del Derecho*, no. 44 (June 2021): 97–123, <https://doi.org/10.7203/CEFD.44.19402>.

¹³ Emad Hamdeh, *Salafism and Traditionalism: Scholarly Authority in Modern Islam*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108756594>.

¹⁴ Norbert Oberauer, “Canonization in Islamic Law: A Case Study Based on Shāfi’ī Literature,” *Islamic Law and Society* 29, nos. 1–2 (2022): 123–208, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685195-bja10021>.

¹⁵ Sulaiman Jamrozi et al., “Maqāṣid Al-Sharīa in The Study of Hadith and Its Implication for The Renewal of Islamic Law.”

¹⁶ Amr Osman, “The Qur’an and the Hadith as Sources of Islamic Law,” in *Routledge Handbook of Islamic Law*, 1st ed., ed. Khaled Abou El Fadl et al. (Routledge, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315753881-8>.

¹⁷ Meiloud, “A Conflict Between Divine Texts and Human Legal Needs?”

legal rulings) and those that are *'ādī/jibillī* (ordinary human practices), or to determine the extent to which *'urf* and may serve as the basis of interpretation.

It is at this point that the research gap addressed by this article emerges. Although existing scholarship has acknowledged the importance of context, no study has systematically outlined a framework for classifying *af'āl al-rasūl* with clear analytical tools. This article seeks to fill that gap by revisiting Al-Ghazālī's *Al-Mankhūl*, employing categories based on *qarīnah*, *maqāṣid*, *'urf*, and *maṣlaḥah* as operational instruments. This contribution is expected to provide a methodological bridge between fidelity to the text and sensitivity to context in the study of contemporary Islamic law.

This study employs a qualitative, library-based approach with a critical focus on *Al-Mankhūl min Ta'liqāt al-Uṣūl* by Imām Al-Ghazālī. The text was selected as the primary source because it explicitly addresses *af'āl al-rasūl* (the Prophet's actions) and offers a methodological framework for determining their legal status. Secondary sources include other classical *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh* works that discuss *'urf* and *maṣlaḥah*, as well as contemporary scholarship on the debates between textualism and contextualism in the study of the sunnah. The analysis is grounded in Al-Ghazālī's *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh* methodology, particularly three principles. First, *maqāṣid al-Sharia* provides the foundation by situating *maṣlaḥah* as the central aim of Islamic law, ensuring that the sunnah is interpreted beyond literal imitation toward the realization of its higher purposes. Second, the concept of *'urf* acknowledges that social customs, insofar as they do not conflict with Sharia, may serve as a valid basis for legal reasoning, allowing differentiation between cultural practices of seventh-century Arabia and universally binding norms. Third, the principle of *qarīnah* highlights the importance of contextual indicators in classifying Prophetic actions, whether *tashrī'ī* (normative) or *'ādī/jibillī* (habitual and cultural). This methodological framework is embedded within Al-Ghazālī's integrative epistemology, which unites theology, law, and ethics. Accordingly, the study critically examines how Al-Ghazālī categorized the Prophet's conduct and assessed the role of *'urf* and *maṣlaḥah* as interpretive tools. In doing so, it evaluates the extent to which Al-Ghazālī's approach can be offered as an alternative

methodology for bridging the tension between textual fidelity and contextual sensitivity in Islamic legal studies.

Prophet's Actions Classification in al-Mankhūl

Imām Al-Ghazālī situates his discussion of *af'āl al-rasul*—the actions of the Prophet (SAW)—upon the epistemic foundations he outlines in the introduction (*muqaddimah*) of al-Mankhūl. In this introduction, Al-Ghazālī affirms the triadic structure of the religious sciences: (1) *Ilm Al-Kalām* (theology/tawḥīd), (2) *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh* (*fiqh*'s methodology), and (3) *Fiqh* (Islamic Jurisprudence).¹⁸ These three disciplines are not isolated clusters but form an interrelated hierarchy: theology establishes the truth of the prophetic message and the authority of revelation; *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh* provides the methodological tools for reading texts and actions; and *fiqh* translates those readings into concrete legal rulings. For this reason, the Prophet's actions cannot be treated as a mere catalogue of behaviors to be imitated mechanically. Rather, they must be understood through sound theology, careful legal methodology, and jurisprudential orientation that ensures applicability and promotes *maṣlaḥah* (public welfare).

In the section *Al-Qawl fī Af'āl Ar-Rasūl*, Al-Ghazālī begins with a sharp critique of literalist tendencies: “*wa ḡanna ba'd al-muḥaddiṣin anna al-tashabbuh bihi fī kullī af'ālihi sunnah wa huwa ghalāṭ*”. In other words: “some scholars of hadith believed that resembling the Prophet in all his actions is always sunnah, and this assumption is mistaken.”¹⁹ This criticism is not mere polemic, but a methodological clarification that the Prophet's example is multilayered. Some actions are intended to establish legal obligation (*taklīf*), others simply reflect human custom, while some carry devotional value without implying compulsion. To conflate all categories is to undermine the methodological rigor painstakingly developed within the tradition of *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh*.

Before establishing his own position, Al-Ghazālī surveys the spectrum of scholarly opinion. At one pole, certain hadith scholars are reported to have regarded all of the Prophet's actions as sunnah. At the

¹⁸ Ghazzālī, *Al-Mankhūl min Ta'liqāt al-Uṣūl*, hlm. 3.

¹⁹ Ghazzālī, *Al-Mankhūl min Ta'liqāt al-Uṣūl*, hlm. 226.

opposite pole, there are attributions to Abū Ḥanīfah, Ibn Surayj, and Abū ‘Alī ibn Abī Hurayrah suggesting that every action of the Prophet is obligatory unless evidence indicates otherwise. Al-Ghazālī does not accept such claims uncritically; he marks them with the phrase *‘uẓīya ilā ...* and then sets forth what he calls “*al-mukhtār ‘indanā* (the view we uphold)”, a position he attributes also to Imām Asy-Syāfi‘: there is no single ruling that applies to all of the Prophet’s actions; rather, each must be weighed according to *qarīnah* (contextual indicators), *maqṣad* (purpose), and its nature as either worship (*‘ibādah*) or custom (*‘ādah*).²⁰ From this perspective emerges the classification of the Prophet’s conduct. The first two categories in particular serve as safeguards against blind generalization and guide interpretation toward the higher aims of the Sharia: clarity, ease, and benefit.

1) The Prophet’s actions with *qarīnah al-wujūb*

The first category comprises actions of the Prophet accompanied by explicit indicators of obligation, usually in the form of verbal commands, which elevate the act from mere example to binding law. A primary example is the Prophet’s instruction: “*Ṣallū kamā ra’aytumnī uṣallī*” (“Pray as you have seen me pray”). Here, the Prophet’s manner of prayer carries binding force not simply because he performed it, but because a verbal *qarīnah* obliges the community to follow him in this essential ritual act (*‘ibādah maḥḍah*).²¹ The principle is clear: non-verbal action alone cannot establish obligation unless accompanied by an explicit indicator.

This first classification illustrates al-Ghazālī’s caution: the imposition of obligation requires firm evidence, not merely pious impression. He thereby avoids two extremes: excessive formalism, which too easily converts ordinary habits into binding duties, and excessive relativism, which risks diluting the force of genuine commands. By insisting on the presence of *qarīnah al-wujūb* as a condition, al-Ghazālī ensures that core acts of worship such as prayer remain firmly anchored in prophetic authority, while simultaneously preventing the proliferation of unwarranted obligations. At this point, the intellectual architecture set out in the *muqaddimah* (the introduction)

²⁰ Ghazzālī, *Al- Mankebūl min Ta’liqāt al-Uṣūl*.

²¹ Ghazzālī, *Al- Mankebūl min Ta’liqāt al-Uṣūl*.

of al-Mankhūl operates subtly: theology guarantees obedience to the Prophet as the bearer of divine command; *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* sets the rules by which a model becomes an obligation; and *Fiqh* articulates these rules into consistent legal practice. These three layers interlock to ensure that claims of obligation arise not from subjective inclination, but from the structure of authoritative evidence.

2) Actions Classified as *Af'āl al-ʿĀdiyyah* (Ordinary Human Habits)

The second category consists of actions that stem from the Prophet's human habits and the cultural environment in which he lived: his manner of eating and the tools he used, his choice of food, style of clothing, hairstyle, manner of sitting or sleeping, ways of traveling, and so forth. In these matters, al-Ghazālī states plainly: “*falā ḥukma lahu aṣṣan*” (“such actions carry no legal ruling whatsoever”).²² By this, al-Ghazālī does not dismiss the value of the Prophet's example, but situates it in its proper place: the realm of *ʿurf* (custom, tradition, convention), which (so long as it does not conflict with the revealed texts) does not ascend to the level of *taklīfī* obligation.

A frequently cited example is the practice of eating with three fingers. Scholars classify it as *sunnah jibillīyah*: an act imitated out of love, but without binding legal force. The same applies to garments such as the *qamīṣ* or *imāmāh*, which were forms of dress consistent with the *ʿurf* of seventh-century Arabia. Muslims in other lands who cover their *ʿawrah* and uphold the ethics of modest attire are not considered deficient in *sunnah* even if they do not wear the same models. In this context, *ʿurf* becomes a crucial filter to prevent “Arab cultural forms” from being elevated into “universal Sharia norms.” Such customs may indeed be preserved as signs of affection, but they must not be imposed as binding standards upon all.

The *fiqh* maxim *al-ʿādah muḥakkamah* counters tendencies to conflate outward form with substantive content. al-Ghazālī demonstrates that the nobility of the Prophet's example is preserved when we separate the values it embodies from the forms shaped by cultural context. Values such as cleanliness, simplicity, and dignity—in matters of eating and dress—constitute the substance, which can be realized in diverse forms appropriate to different times and places.

²² Ghazzālī, *Al-Mankhūl min Taʿlīqāt al-Uṣūl*.

Conversely, freezing the forms under the pretext of piety risks imposing burdens not intended by the Sharia, thereby obstructing the pursuit of *maṣlahah*. This also reflects the coherence of the triadic framework outlined in the *muqaddimah*: theology binds loyalty to the message rather than to lifestyle as mere style; *uṣūl* requires proof before elevating a habit to legal status; and fiqh ensures that the Sharia remains expansive enough to accommodate cultural diversity. By classifying *aḥāl al-ʿādiyyah* as a domain without *taklifi* rulings, Al-Ghazālī does not belittle the sunnah, but safeguards it from misplaced sacralization.

Taken together, the first two categories establish a dual foundation: *qarīnah* as the determinant that elevates an action to legal status, and *ʿurf* as the criterion that differentiates custom from normativity. Each restrains excess in its own way: *qarīnah* prevents the proliferation of unwarranted obligations derived from non-verbal acts, while *ʿurf* blocks the conflation of Arab forms with universal law.²³ In this way, the Prophet's example remains a living guide: certain acts are binding because they are commanded, while others remain permissible because they are ordinary custom. This framework aligns with the objectives of the Sharia to maintain ease and avert hardship. The first two classifications thus underscore that *taklifi* obligation must rest on sound evidence and sufficient indication, while reverence for the sunnah does not require cultural uniformity. In this way, al-Ghazālī preserves the dignity of the sunnah: protecting the community from rigid formalism without lapsing into loose relativism; binding where the Prophet bound, and granting latitude where he left the law open.

3) Actions Intended for Worship (*Taʿabbud*)

This category covers actions that outwardly resemble ordinary habits but are accompanied by indications that the Prophet intended them as acts of worship. Examples include fasting on Mondays and Thursdays or increasing supplications at specific times. On the surface, eating or refraining from food on certain days may appear to be a personal preference, but the presence of explanatory remarks or the Prophet's consistent repetition transforms them into devotional models. In such cases, the *qarīnah* is not a direct command but rather

²³ Agus Moh Najib, "Reestablishing Indonesian Madhhab: 'Urf and the Contribution of Intellectualism," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 58, no. 1 (2020): 171–208, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2020.581.171-208>.

the stated purpose or intentional consistency that marks the act with devotional significance.²⁴

Al-Ghazālī recognizes this category because he is aware that not all forms of worship are restricted to explicit verbal commands. There are patterns of prophetic behavior that were meant to draw nearer to God without being mandated by binding texts, and these become *sunnah ta'abbudiyyah*. Distinguishing this category from *af'āl al-'ādiyyah* prevents two mistakes: equating devotional acts with ordinary customs, or elevating customs devoid of devotional intent into *sunnah*. Here the principle of *Maqāṣid al-Shari'ah* plays a central role. Recommended devotional acts practiced by the Prophet allow the community opportunities to increase spiritual intimacy with God without imposing obligation on others, thereby preserving a balance between spiritual intensity and legal latitude.²⁵ In other words, *maqāṣid* functions as a lens that separates devotional intent from mere habit, and places each within its proper position in the legal spectrum.

4) Actions Indicating Permissibility (*Ibāḥah*)

The next category consists of actions of the Prophet that serve as indicators of permissibility. These are actions performed without the intention of worship, without being tied to binding custom, and without any indication of obligation. For instance, the Prophet sometimes chose one route over another during travel, or consumed certain foods that were not part of his regular practice. In such cases, there is no element of command, devotion, or cultural prescription to be followed, making the action a basis for legal flexibility. Al-Ghazālī regards this category of *ibāḥah* as important for protecting the Sharia from the tendency to sacralize every detail of the Prophet's life. By acknowledging actions that purely demonstrate permissibility, the Prophet ensured that the Sharia did not become burdened with unnecessary imitation. The maxim "*al-aṣlu fī asy-asyā' al-ibāḥah*" ("the original ruling of things is permissibility") finds reinforcement here, reminding scholars that not everything the Prophet did requires normative weight. This category is closely connected to *'urf*. Acts of permissibility open space for cultural adaptation so long as they do not

²⁴ Ghazzālī, *Al-Mankhūl min Ta'liqāt al-Uṣūl*.

²⁵ Muhammad Abdul 'Āṭī, *Al-Maqāṣid Asy-Syari'ah Wa Aṣaruhā Fī Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmī* (Darel Hadith, 2007).

contradict the principles of the Sharia.²⁶ This illustrates the contemporary relevance of al-Ghazālī's thought: Muslims may live with diverse cultural practices without guilt for not replicating every detail of the Prophet's lifestyle that falls within the realm of permissibility.

5) Actions Requiring Interpretation (*Af'āl Mu'ammalāt*)

The final category highlighted by al-Ghazālī involves actions of the Prophet that may be misunderstood if detached from their context or without supplementary *qarīnah*. For example, the Prophet may have engaged in an act that outwardly appears to contradict a general prohibition, but upon closer examination, it is revealed to have a specific rationale not intended for universal application. Without interpretation, such acts could create confusion or even apparent contradiction within the law.

Al-Ghazālī employs the principle of *qarīnah as-siyāq* (contextual indicators) as a guide for this interpretive work. He stresses that understanding the Prophet's actions requires comprehensive data—chronology, social conditions, and interactions with others—before assigning a legal status. In this way, he establishes a scholarly standard that rejects deriving rulings from isolated instances of prophetic behavior. Interpretation in this sense is not meant to diminish the Prophet's authority but to preserve the coherence of his teachings as a whole. From the perspective of *Maqāṣid al-Shari'ah*, interpretation becomes a necessary instrument to ensure that texts and prophetic actions are not understood so literally that they undermine the very objectives of the Sharia.²⁷

If in the first two categories (*qarīnah al-nujūb* and *af'āl al-'ādiyyah*) the role of *'urf* appears clearly as the criterion that differentiates custom from religious norm, in the following three categories the relationship becomes more complex. *'Urf* interacts with *maqāṣid* in distinguishing pure permissibility from devotional practices, while also guiding interpretive efforts so that they remain aligned with the objectives of the Sharia. The category of *ta'abbud* acknowledges that certain

²⁶ Landy Trisna Abdurrahman, "Conflict in Islamic Jurisprudence: Noel J. Coulson's Historical Approach and His Contribution to the Study of Islamic Law," *JIL: Journal of Islamic Law* 3, no. 1 (2022): 74–93, <https://doi.org/10.24260/jil.v3i1.495>.

²⁷ Abdul 'Āṭī, *Al-Maqāṣid Ayy-Syari'ah Wa Aṣarubā Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami*.

devotional practices of the Prophet may have been shaped by the ‘urf of seventh-century Arabia, yet their devotional value can be adapted into forms relevant to Muslim communities in different contexts. The category of *ibāḥah* allows local ‘urf to fill in the details of daily life without requiring validation from every action of the Prophet. Meanwhile, the category of *mu’awwalāt* requires contextual reading that often involves knowledge of the customs prevailing at the time the act was performed, so as to avoid misinterpretation.

Al-Ghazālī’s approach is deeply tied to *maṣlahah*. He does not allow the Sharia to be confined to formalistic forms that burden the community or obstruct benefit. On the contrary, his approach elevates *maṣlahah* as a key measure in determining whether a given action of the Prophet is binding or not. The maxim “*al-masyaqqah tajlibu at-taysir*” (“hardship necessitates ease”) operates implicitly within this classification,²⁸ ensuring that the Prophet’s example brings blessing without becoming a burden.

Taken together, the five categories demonstrate that al-Ghazālī anticipated the debates that today arise between literalists and contextualists. Literalists tend to demand conformity with every detail of the Prophet’s life, whereas contextualists risk lapsing into excessive relativism. Al-Ghazālī charts a middle path: all actions of the Prophet are acknowledged as sources of law, yet their binding force varies depending on *qarīnah*, devotional intent, and their relevance to ‘urf and *maṣlahah*.²⁹

Through this approach, the Prophet’s example remains both alive and applicable. There are core teachings that are obligatory because they are commanded; there are recommended acts of devotion that enhance closeness to God; there are acts of permissibility that allow the community creative space within culture; and there are actions requiring interpretation to avoid misunderstanding. All of these

²⁸ Ahmad Ar-Raisuni, *Naẓariyāt Al-Maqashid ‘inda al-Imām Asy-Syāṭibi* (Muassasah al-Jāmi’ah, 1992); Landy Trisna Abdurrahman et al., “SDGs and Islamic Studies: Fiqh Muamalat, Sustainable Development, and Maqashid Asy-Syari’ah,” *Aḏ-Zarqa’: Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam* 14, no. 2 (2022): 175–95, <https://doi.org/10.14421/azzarqa.v14i2.2583>.

²⁹ Abdul Majid An-Najār, *Maqāṣid Asy-Syari’ah bi Ab’ādin Jadidin* (Darul Gharb Al-Islamiy, 2008).

operate within a single framework that safeguards the Prophet's authority while preserving the expansiveness of the Sharia. This approach also reconnects us with al-Ghazālī's epistemic triad: *tamhīd* secures obedience to the revealed message; *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* provides the methodological apparatus for classification; and *Fiqh* translates the results of classification into practical rules. Within this framework, each category of the Prophet's conduct is explained in a manner that is not only methodologically sound but also aligned with the broader objectives of the Sharia.³⁰

‘Urf and Maṣlaḥāt

Within the methodological framework affirmed in al-Mankhūl, not every action of the Prophet is automatically normative. The roles of *‘urf* and *maṣlaḥah* are decisive in distinguishing between actions that are truly *tasyrī‘ī* (intended as legislation) and those that are merely *‘ādī* (ordinary or cultural habits). Recognition of the category *al-af‘āl al-mu‘tadah* requires readers of the sunnah to situate the Prophet's conduct within its cultural horizon: he lived in seventh-century Arabia, spoke Arabic, dressed, ate, sat, and interacted socially in ways consistent with his community—except in matters explicitly determined by revelation.³¹ For this reason, as emphasized in the tradition of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, actions performed by the Prophet due to habit or cultural convention do not automatically become binding law unless accompanied by a *qarīnah* that indicates legislative intent.³² Here, al-Ghazālī's logic regarding *sunnah fi‘liyyah* connects directly: if an explicit command accompanies an action, its status rises; if not, the default is that it is neither obligatory nor recommended—especially when the action is common to ordinary human life.

The practical implications appear in everyday examples. The

³⁰ Dr. Ali Gomaa, “Tartīb Al-Maqāṣid Asy-Syar‘iyyah,” paper presented at Abhāṣ wa Waqa’i’ Al-Mu’tamar Al-‘Ām AṢ-Ṣanī wa Al-‘Isyrīn, Majlis A’lā Lissyu’un Al-Islamī, 2013.

³¹ Ghazzālī, *Al-Mankhūl min Ta’līqāt al-Uṣūl*.

³² Abdul Wahab Khalaf, *Ilmu Usul Al-Fiqh* (Maktabah al-Da’wah al-Islamiyah Syabab al-Azhar, 1986); George Makdisi, “The Juridical Theology of Shafi’i: Origins and Significance of Usul al-Fiqh,” *Studia Islamica*, no. 59 (1984): 5, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1595294>.

Prophet's garments—*qamiṣ*, *'imāmah*, and so forth—were expressions of Arab *'urf*; there is no command to “wear the *qamiṣ*.” Thus, Muslims in the Malay–Indonesian world who wear batik or *baju koko* are not abandoning the sunnah so long as they uphold the principles of covering the *'awrat*, cleanliness, modesty, and dignity (without arrogance).³³ By contrast, eating with the right hand carries normative weight because there is a prohibition against using the left, whereas technical details such as using three fingers or utensils return to *'urf*. The essence lies in the *adab* of eating—reciting *basmalah*, avoiding wastefulness, eating from what is nearest—rather than the form. The same principle explains the praise of *siwāk*: what is intended is oral cleanliness. In different settings and with changing technology, using a fluoride toothbrush accomplishes the same objective; using the *siwāk* remains meritorious as *ittibā'*, but the tool itself is not the essence of the ruling so long as cleanliness is achieved.

The incident of the instruction, “*Do not perform 'Aṣr prayer except at Banī Qurayẓah*,” further illustrates how the Prophet's words contained interpretive space. Some Companions understood it literally, while others grasped its underlying purpose, to hasten the march while still preserving prayer. The Prophet validated both. The methodological lesson is clear: for actions or statements with practical aims, legal judgment requires attention to *qarīnah*. Al-Ghazālī applies this in his classifications: acts of pure devotion without a command incline toward *mandūb*; ordinary customs remain free from *taklīf*; ambiguous cases at minimum establish *raf' al-ḥaraj*.³⁴

In economic matters, the prohibition against hoarding harvests in agrarian Madinah was aimed at preventing price manipulation and injustice. In modern economies—with supply chains, warehouses, and regulated markets—the principle to uphold is the *maqṣad* of justice and public welfare, not the technical form of storage.³⁵ Similarly, the

³³ Muḥammad Ibn al-Qāsim al-Gāzī, *Fath al-Qarīb al-Mujīb fī Syarḥ AlFāz at-Taqrīb au al-Qawl al-Mukhtār fī Syarḥ Gāyat al-Iḥtiṣār* (Dar Ibn Hazm, 2005).

³⁴ Ahmad Yani Anshori, *On the Gate of Ijtihad* (Siyasat Press, 2008); Wael B. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16, no. 1 (1984): 3–41.

³⁵ Ulinnuha Saifullah, “Commodity Hoarding (Ihtikar) in Surah Al-Hashr: Exploring Historical Roots and Reassessing Interpretative Perspectives,” *Az-Zarqa': Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam* 15, no. 1 (2023): 43–61.

Prophet's practice of sitting on the floor while eating in Arab society does not make eating at a table "anti-*sunnah*." What matters are the inner disposition and *adab* (avoiding arrogance and excess) so that the reference point remains values rather than external forms.

Several aspects of the Prophet's physical appearance reinforce this principle. His long hair reflected local '*urf*'—there is no command to grow one's hair long; indeed, the prohibition of *qazā'* (partial shaving in an odd pattern) shows that the concern was propriety, not length. Short or long hair is therefore *mubah*. Personal imitation remains possible, but it does not become a universal demand.³⁶ Likewise, performing *istinjā'* with stones three times reflected the hygiene tools of the time; the essence of the ruling is effective removal of impurity, so running water or modern bidets today fully realize the objective. Regarding professions, the Prophet's diverse roles—as shepherd, merchant, head of state, and military leader—are not a checklist of occupations to replicate. The binding *sunnah* lies in integrity, trustworthiness, diligence, and the prohibition of begging.³⁷ Across all these examples, '*urf*' functions as a contextual variable that filters whether a prophetic act conveys a general legal norm or simply reflects neutral social convention.³⁸

From this perspective, the connection between '*urf*' and *maṣlaḥah* becomes clear. Actions that promote universal benefits—safeguarding religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property—tend toward the *tasyrī'* category; those that do not carry such orientation generally return to the realm of '*adab*' or permissibility. Thus, the prohibition of *isrāf* (extravagance) and the recommendation of moderation in eating lie at the heart of the *maqāṣid* of health, while culinary preferences such as *tharīd* or pumpkin do not become norms that must be imitated. In the Indonesian social setting, local dress such as the sarung and peci—which are modest, cover the '*awrat*', and are socially accepted—represent examples of '*urf ṣaḥīḥ*' that effectively serve da'wah. By contrast, imposing Arab forms in every context could hinder the

³⁶ Sara Pendergast et al., *Fashion, Costume, and Culture: Clothing, Headwear, Body Decorations, and Footwear through the Ages* (UXL, 2003).

³⁷ Ahmad Yani Anshori, "Konsep Siyasah dalam Yahudi dan Islam," *Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah dan Hukum* 50, no. 1 (2016): 181–98, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v50i1.169>.

³⁸ Najib, "Reestablishing Indonesian Madhhab."

reception of values. The *fiqh* maxim that “laws may change with the change of time and place” applies to socio-cultural matters rather than *tauqifi* (fixed) rulings, and ensures that law continues to achieve its purpose of mercy.

This also explains why al-Ghazālī underscores the principle of *rafʿ al-ḥaraj* in relation to ambiguous actions: if a deed of the Prophet can be understood either as devotion or as mere permissibility, and is not accompanied by indicators of obligation or recommendation, then at minimum it removes any assumption of prohibition.³⁹ This principle of ease ensures that religion is not burdened with demands the Prophet himself did not impose, and harmonizes the application of the sunnah with the real welfare of the community. This outline is consistent with the classification in al-Mankhūl: prophetic actions accompanied by explicit commands create binding rulings; actions that are human customs carry no *taklifi* force; and acts of devotion without clear commands are understood as recommended (*mandub*).⁴⁰ In this scheme, *ʿurf* helps identify which forms may vary across cultures, while *maṣlahah* directs attention to the ultimate objectives of the Sharia, so that the sunnah is understood as a compass of values rather than a checklist of external imitations. On this basis, cultural flexibility does not amount to relativism: it is the means by which the substance of the Sharia remains alive across time and space, grounded in *qarīnah*, *maqāṣid*, and the classifications of *fiʿliyyah* actions as outlined by al-Ghazālī.⁴¹

If the earlier discussion focused on distinguishing categories of the Prophet’s actions in relation to *ʿurf* and normative indicators, the present emphasis shifts toward the dynamics of applying those principles in *ijtihad* across different eras. In al-Mankhūl, al-Ghazālī shows that the methodology of *Uṣūl* does not stop at classification alone, but extends to the capacity to link text and practice with an ever-changing reality. Here, *ʿurf* functions as a decisive variable: it facilitates contextualization without diluting legal substance. The *fiqh* maxim *al-*

³⁹ Ghazzālī, *Al-Mankhūl min Taʿlīqāt al-Uṣūl*.

⁴⁰ ‘Alī Jum’ah, *Aṭ-Ṭariq ilā At-Turaṣ Al-Islamī*, 4th ed. (Nahḍat Miṣr, 2009); Wael B. Hallaq, “From Fatwās To Furū: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law,” *Islamic Law and Society* 1, no. 1 (1994): 29–65, <https://doi.org/10.1163/156851994X00147>.

⁴¹ Jum’ah, *Aṭ-Ṭariq ilā At-Turaṣ Al-Islamī*; Ar-Raisuni, *Naẓariyāt Al-Maqashid ʿinda al-Imām Aṣ-Ṣyaṭibi*.

‘adab muḥakkamah operates not as a license for unrestricted adaptation, but as a filter to ensure that law remains relevant and beneficial (*maṣlahah*).⁴²

One implication of this framework is that rulings grounded in sound *‘urf* are inherently dynamic. When the Prophet practiced certain technical forms without issuing commands, and those forms change with social development, the change does not constitute abandonment of the *sunnah* but rather the implementation of the spirit of the Sharia in new forms. For instance, the structure of sales contracts in the markets of Madinah differs from contemporary digital transactions, yet the principles—mutual consent, clarity of object, and honesty—remain binding. Here the intersection of *‘urf* and *maṣlahah* becomes evident: evolving customs must guarantee the objectives of the Sharia, and the same applies in the sphere of social interaction. The Prophet’s greetings embodied the values of respect and prayer; the phrase “*assalamu’alaykum*” is *tauqifi*, but gestures or supplementary expressions adopted by society may be classified as *‘urf*. For instance, shaking hands after prayer—though not consistently practiced by the Prophet in the mosque—functions in some communities as an expression of brotherhood and is not at odds with the underlying values. Such behavior does not rise to the level of *sunnah ta‘abbudiyyah*, but neither is it forbidden if it conveys positive meaning. This principle prevents the tendency to label every new form as *bid‘ah*, so long as it does not contradict the *maqāṣid* or definitive texts (*dalil qat‘i*).⁴³

The correlation between *‘urf* and *maṣlahah* is also evident in matters of public policy. When the Prophet dispatched Companions to administer *ṣakāt*, the methods of recording and distribution were adjusted to local conditions. Today, *ṣakāt* management systems employ software, bank transfers, and even digital wallets; yet the essence—collecting from those able and distributing to those entitled—remains intact.⁴⁴ These technical changes represent the application of

⁴² Yayan Sopyan and Syamsuddin, “Sulūk al-Qāḍi: Muqāranah Bayna Mafhūm al-māwardī Fī Kitāb adab al-Qāḍi wa Qawā’id Sulūk al-Qaḍa Fī Indūnisiyā,” *AHKAM* 21, no. 2 (2021): 445–70, <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v21i2.19671>.

⁴³ Khan and Ramadan, *Contemporary Ijtihad Limits and Controversies*.

⁴⁴ Muhamad Ulul Albab Musaffa et al., “Study the Philosophy of Islamic Law in Determination Percentage of Zakat Mal,” *Az-Zarqa’: Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam*

contemporary *'urf* working in synergy with *maṣlahah*, since they expand outreach and enhance efficiency. This accords with the maxim *taghayyur al-aḥkām bi taghayyur al-aẓmān wa al-amkinah* ("laws may change with changes of time and place"), which applies to matters of social transactions and custom, though not to *tauqifi* aspects of worship.

It is equally important to stress that not every prevailing custom in society can serve as a legal basis. Within his framework of *Uṣūl Fiqh*, al-Ghazālī distinguishes between *'urf ṣaḥīḥ* (customs in harmony with the Sharia) and *'urf fāsid* (customs in conflict with it). For instance, bribery in administrative procedures is a corrupt *'urf* and cannot be invoked as legal precedent; it must instead be reformed to preserve the *maqāṣid* of justice and to prevent injustice. Conversely, the practice of delivering part of the Friday sermon in the local language—when the congregation does not understand Arabic—qualifies as *'urf ṣaḥīḥ*, as it serves the *maqāṣid* of conveying knowledge and moral exhortation.⁴⁵

In the reading of *sunnah fi'liyyah*, the role of *'urf* is crucial for distinguishing between outward form and substantive teaching. The Prophet, for example, used a camel as a means of transport. The essence of this act lies in efficiency, comfort, and passenger safety, not the specific vehicle itself. In the modern era, cars, trains, or airplanes more effectively realize these values. Indeed, if modern vehicles prove more beneficial (faster, safer, and more accessible) their use aligns more closely with *Maqāṣid al-Shariah* than clinging to outdated forms.⁴⁶ In this way, the principle of *'urf* ensures that the sunnah remains relevant across different times and places, while preventing *ijtihād* from falling into extreme literalism that neglects real *maṣlahah*.

The principles of *'urf* and *maṣlahah* also serve to correct readings that overemphasize *ta'abbudiyyah* in matters that are, in reality, *'ādī*. For instance, while in the Prophet's time debts were recorded with oral testimony or simple written notes, today electronic contracts with

14, no. 1 (2022): 19–40, <https://doi.org/10.14421/azzarqa.v14i1.2589>; Sherin Kunhibava et al., "Ṣukūk on Blockchain: A Legal, Regulatory and Shari'ah Review," *ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance* 13, no. 1 (2021): 118–35, <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJIF-06-2020-0120>.

⁴⁵ Az-Zuhaylī, *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh Al-Hanafī*.

⁴⁶ An-Najār, *Maqāṣid Asy-Syarī'ah bi Ab'adin Jadidin*; Abdul 'Āṭī, *Al-Maqāṣid Asy-Syarī'ah Wa Aṣaruhā Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islamī*.

digital signatures are both possible and legally valid. The Qur'anic command in al-Baqarah [2]: 282 (to record debts in order to prevent disputes) remains operative in this new format. This reflects the epistemology of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*: not being trapped in form, but adhering to values and objectives.

In the sphere of governance, *ʿurf* and *maṣlaḥah* are critical for formulating Islamic public law that is compatible with modern state structures. The Prophet did not prescribe a fixed bureaucratic system; what he bequeathed were principles of accountability, justice, and trustworthiness. Consequently, modern electoral systems—when designed to ensure justice and representation—can be accepted as *ʿurf* consistent with the *maqāṣid*, even though such systems were unknown in the prophetic era.⁴⁷ Al-Ghazālī would view such arrangements as valid *ijtihād*, justified by general legal maxims and responsive to contemporary realities.

Equally important is the connection between *ʿurf*–*maṣlaḥah* and *rafʿ al-ḥaraj* (removal of hardship). Many social practices facilitate the community's observance of Sharia. A simple example is the use of microphones for the call to prayer (*aẓān*) and Friday sermons. Though absent in the Prophet's time, the benefit is obvious: amplifying the voice and enabling broader participation in worship. Rejecting it merely due to lack of precedent would contradict the principle of removing hardship. This underscores that preserving *maṣlaḥah* acknowledged by the Sharia is no less important than preserving outward form.⁴⁸

Thus, this stage demonstrates that *ʿurf* and *maṣlaḥah* are not passive variables, but active instruments in actualizing *sunnah fiʿliyyah* proportionately. They ensure that the Prophet's conduct, as classified in al-Mankhūl, continues to guide Muslim life amid rapid change. *ʿurf*

⁴⁷ Aharon Layish, "Islamic Law in the Modern World: Nationalization, Islamization, Reinstatement," *ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY*, 2021, 33; Moch Nur Ichwan, "The Making of a Pancasila State: Political Debates on Secularism, Islam and the State in Indonesia," in *SOLAS Research Paper Series* (Sophia Organization for Islamic Area Studies Institute of Asian Cultures, 2012).

⁴⁸ Muhammad Fakhru Mahdi and Ahmad Yani Anshori, "The Legal Politics of the Aceh Governor's Policy Regarding Religious Activities in Public Sphere: David Easton's Political Theory Perspective," *Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah Dan Hukum* 55, no. 2 (2022): 1, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v56i1.1105>.

provides the socio-cultural frame, while *maṣlahah* directs attention to the higher objectives of law. Together they safeguard *ijtihād* so that it remains faithful to the spirit of the Sharia, avoids burdens the Prophet never imposed, and anticipates new challenges without losing its orientation. This is the harmony between text, context, and purpose that renders al-Ghazālī's methodology of *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh* ever-living and applicable across generations.

Critiques of Modern Textualism and Hadithism

The reduction of the sunnah to a mere checklist of the Prophet's daily actions to be imitated literally, without consideration of context, has long drawn criticism from scholars. In al-Mankhūl, Imām al-Ghazālī identifies this as a serious error/mistake (*ghalat*), because it disregards the objectives of the Sharia and the methodological principles of *istinbāt* developed in the tradition of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*. This model of understanding, which modern scholars often describe as hadith-centrism or Hadithism, tends to interpret religion exclusively through individual hadith, detached from a holistic hermeneutical framework.⁴⁹ As a result, the sunnah is narrowed to external attributes and actions—such as measuring one's trousers above the ankles in accordance with the *isbal* hadith, growing the beard without regard to social context, or rejecting all forms of music—while ignoring the diversity of scholarly opinions and the historical background of legal ruling.

In the *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* tradition, the context of *asbāb al-wurūd* (background context of a hadith) plays a vital role in shaping interpretation.⁵⁰ The Prophet's *sunnah fi'l-ḥayyah* was often situational (*al-waqtīyyah*), as demonstrated in the variations of *ṣalāt al-ḥanf* narrated from two different battle circumstances. Al-Ghazālī affirms that both forms are valid as wartime dispensations, and thus need not be reduced to a single fixed model. For rigid textualists, however, such differences are seen as contradictions that require one form to abrogate the other,

⁴⁹ Rakhmatullin et al., "Meaning of Sunnah in Islam."

⁵⁰ A. Rippin, "The Function of Asbāb Al-Nuzūl in Qur'ānic Exegesis," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 51, no. 1 (1988): 1–20, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00020188>.

whereas the very flexibility of these rulings is in fact the intent of the Sharia.

This tendency also undermines the role of *ijtihad* and scholarly reasoning. For adherents of Hadithism, it often seems sufficient to compile authentic hadith and apply them directly.⁵¹ Yet texts demand explanation, correlation with other proofs, and readings that account for societal conditions. Works such as al-Albānī's *Ṣiḡat Ṣalāt An-Nabī* reflect a sincere desire to restore ritual practice to the sunnah,⁵² but in application they often promote exclusivist claims that only one model is correct. Such an approach erodes the diversity of practice acknowledged within the legal schools, fosters polarization, and neglects the reality that many proofs are *ẓanni al-dilalah* (open to interpretive variance), thereby allowing legitimate differences of opinion.

Another problem arises when the sunnah is viewed exclusively through a legal-formal lens, stripping it of its ethical and spiritual dimensions. The Prophet Muhammad was not only a lawgiver but a living exemplar who integrated law, ethics, and wisdom. Yet in textualist paradigms, priorities are often inverted: heated debates about the position of the hands in prayer are treated as critical, while humility and attentiveness of the heart are overlooked. Outward symbols such as the beard, face veil, or the ban on images in the home are elevated as markers of religiosity, while the moral essence of the Prophetic mission (such as gentleness of speech, compassion, and tolerance) is marginalized.

When all Prophetic actions are absolutized in a literal manner, this also gives rise to claims rooted in pseudo-science or forced medical explanations. For example, the Prophet's act of drinking while standing at 'Arafah is sometimes construed as a unique health prescription, whereas the actual context was the crowded setting of the pilgrimage.⁵³ Similarly, the Prophet's habit of eating dates daily has been generalized

⁵¹ Rakhmatullin et al., "Meaning of Sunnah in Islam."

⁵² Hamdeh, *Salafism and Traditionalism*.

⁵³ Chiheb Negadi, "ARCHAEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTATION OF HISTORICAL EVENTS IN THE HOLY QURAN - STORIES OF THE PROPHETS AS A MODEL-," *RIMAK International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 04, no. 01 (2022): 01–17, <https://doi.org/10.47832/2717-8293.15.1>.

into the claim that dates are a universal “superfood” for every illness, ignoring the distinction between cultural habits and health-related wisdom. Such approaches, rather than honoring the sunnah, reduce it to an ahistorical set of practical tips.

Al-Ghazālī emphasizes the necessity of *qarīnah* (contextual indicators) in understanding the *sunnah fi’liyyah*. This approach resonates with the revival of *Maqāṣid al-Sharī’ah* discourse, which seeks to interpret texts within the framework of the higher purposes of Islamic law: to secure benefit and remove hardship. Without such a framework, legal interpretation often becomes rigid and unresponsive to social change.⁵⁴ In practice, extreme textualism can also lead to the rejection of *ijtihād* instruments such as *qiyās*, on the grounds that the Prophet himself always awaited revelation. Such a view, once promoted by certain Salafī figures in Yemen, ignores the reality that revelation has ceased, and thus the Muslim community must employ the tools of *ijtihād* to address new issues. This anti-innovation stance in law has been visible, for instance, in the rejection of vaccination or mask usage during the pandemic on the pretext that “these did not exist in the Prophet’s time.” From the perspective of *maqāṣid*, such reasoning is clearly mistaken.⁵⁵

Hadithism also tends to dismiss the collective authority of scholars and the legacy of *fiqh* transmitted across generations. Under the banner of “returning to the proofs,” they often overlook *ijma’* and the living practices of the Companions and the Successors (*tābi’in*).⁵⁶ Imām Mālik, for example, regarded the *‘amal ablu al-Madīnah* as the manifestation of a living sunnah, even when it sometimes diverged from solitary written hadith (*ḥabār aḥād*).⁵⁷ This demonstrates that the sunnah has never been merely a text but also a living tradition embodied in communal practice.

Restoring the sunnah to its substantive meaning requires

⁵⁴ M. Maimun and Endah Andayani, “Understanding the Connection Between Social Construction and Islamic Values;” paper presented at 5th Asian Education Symposium 2020 (AES 2020), Bandung, Indonesia, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210715.061>.

⁵⁵ Hamdeh, *Salafism and Traditionalism*; Khan and Ramadan, *Contemporary Ijtihad Limits and Controversies*.

⁵⁶ Rakhmatullin et al., “Meaning of Sunnah in Islam.”

⁵⁷ Jum’ah, *Tarikh Uṣūl Al-Fiqh*.

situating it as a guide for life, leading the community toward God and social betterment. Al-Ghazālī provides a clear boundary: one must implement what is explicitly commanded or recommended, while treating the Prophet's non-*taklīfī* actions as an area of flexibility. The principles of *yusr* (ease) and *raf' al-ḥaraj* (removal of hardship) are central, as underscored by the Qur'anic verse: "*Yurīdu Allāhu bikum al-yusr wa lā yurīdu bikum al-'usr*" ("God intends ease for you and does not intend hardship for you"). Textualism that constricts this space of ease ultimately contradicts the very spirit of the Sharia. Thus, the critique of textualism and hadithism is not a rejection of the proofs (*dalīl*), but rather a call to revive the holistic tradition of interpreting the sunnah as inherited from the classical *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* scholars. The Prophet's sunnah is a compass, not a checklist. It provides direction, vision, and moral orientation, rather than a rigid set of technical prescriptions. Within this framework, works such as al-Mankhūl must be reintroduced so that contemporary Muslims may understand that fidelity to the sunnah does not mean rigidity to the text, but requires the capacity to read context, preserve *maqāṣid*, and embody Prophetic ethics in present realities. From this perspective, it becomes clear that al-Ghazālī's framework offers a balance between loyalty to the text and sensitivity to context. The sunnah *fi'liyyah* is no longer trapped in outward imitation but is proportionally interpreted through *'urf* and *maṣlahah*. This is the methodological contribution that demonstrates how the *turāth* can remain alive as both a source of critique and inspiration for contemporary religious practice.

Conclusion

Based on the analysis conducted, this study finds that reading the Prophet's conduct through al-Ghazālī's framework in al-Mankhūl provides a methodological alternative capable of avoiding the trap of two extremes: literalism, which absolutizes every action of the Prophet as a universal norm, and relativism, which neglects the legal dimension of his actions. By situating *af'āl al-rasūl* (The Prophet's actions) within a classification that takes into account *maqāṣid*, contextual *qarīnah*, and possible connections to local *'urf*, the study demonstrates that some Prophetic actions were indeed intended as binding legal precedents,

while others are better understood as cultural expressions and social conditions of seventh-century Arabia. This approach not only aligns with the classical *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* framework developed by al-Ghazālī, but also allows legal interpretation to adapt to contemporary realities without compromising the authority of the texts.

The analysis of *ʿurf* and *maṣlaḥah* reinforces these findings, as both serve as bridges between text and context. *ʿurf* enables a more realistic reading of the *sunnaḥ fiʿliyyah* by recognizing elements that are local and temporal, while *maṣlaḥah* ensures that such adaptations remain oriented toward benefits acknowledged by the Sharia. The integration of both is evident in al-Ghazālī's epistemic framework, which treats *uṣūl*, *fiqh*, and theology as a unified whole. Accordingly, this study addresses the central question of how the Prophet's conduct should be understood proportionally, not trapped in the mechanical reproduction of tradition, but also not detached from the normative principles that form the core of the Sharia.

Nevertheless, this study has limitations. First, its analytical focus remains primarily on al-Mankhūl and does not develop a broader comparative engagement with other works by al-Ghazālī or his contemporaries, thereby limiting the scope of interpretation to a single framework. Second, the treatment of *ʿurf* and *maṣlaḥah* relies largely on classical sources, whereas their application in modern societies requires enrichment through empirical studies that incorporate contemporary socio-cultural data. Third, the critique of textualism and hadithism advanced in this research has not yet elaborated in detail their practical implications for contemporary fatwa production and religious policymaking. For future research, it is recommended that this approach be tested in a wider range of legal cases, both in the sphere of *ibādah* and *muʿāmalah*, to assess the extent to which al-Ghazālī's methodological flexibility can be operationalized. Subsequent studies may also expand the scope by comparing al-Ghazālī's methodology with that of other jurists from different schools in their treatment of *afʿāl al-rasūl*, thus producing a more comprehensive mapping of the spectrum of classical *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* thought. Furthermore, the integration of field data that records community responses to the application of *ʿurf* and *maṣlaḥah* would be invaluable in assessing the relevance of these findings in diverse social contexts. In this way, the results of this study

contribute not only theoretically to the study of *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh*, but also practically to the ongoing discourse on how Islamic law may remain vibrant and interact harmoniously with changing times.

Bibliography

- Abdul ‘Āṭi, Muhammad. *Al-Maqāṣid Asy-Syari’ah Wa Aṣaruhā Fī Al-Fiqh Al-Islamī*. Darel Hadith, 2007.
- Abdul Wahab Khalaf. *Ilmu Usul Al-Fiqh*. Maktabah al-Da’wah al-Islamiyah Syabab al-Azhar, 1986.
- Abdurrahman, Landy Trisna. “Conflict in Islamic Jurisprudence: Noel J. Coulson’s Historical Approach and His Contribution to the Study of Islamic Law.” *JIL: Journal of Islamic Law* 3, no. 1 (2022): 74–93. <https://doi.org/10.24260/jil.v3i1.495>.
- Abdurrahman, Landy Trisna, Ulinnuha Saifullah, Ishlahu Darussalam, and Sitta A’la Arkham. “SDGs and Islamic Studies: Fiqh Muamalat, Sustainable Development, and Maqashid Asy-Syari’ah.” *Aṣ-Zarqa’: Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam* 14, no. 2 (2022): 175–95. <https://doi.org/10.14421/azzarqa.v14i2.2583>.
- An-Najār, Abdul Majid. *Maqāṣid Asy-Syari’ah bi Ab’ādin Jadidin*. Darul Gharb Al-Islamiy, 2008.
- Anshori, Ahmad Yani. “Konsep Siyasah dalam Yahudi dan Islam.” *Asy-Syir’ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari’ah dan Hukum* 50, no. 1 (2016): 181–98. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v50i1.169>.
- Anshori, Ahmad Yani. *On the Gate of Ijtihad*. Siyasat Press, 2008.
- Ar-Raisuni, Ahmad. *Naẓariyāt Al-Maqashid ‘inda al-Imām Asy-Syāṭibī*. Muassasah al-Jāmi’ah, 1992.
- Az-Zuhaylī, Wahbah. *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh Al-Ḥanafī*. 1st ed. Dārul Al-Maktabī, 2001.
- Crowe, Jonathan, and Constance Y. Lee. *Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788110044>.

- Dewi, Subkhani Kusuma. "Otoritas Teks Sebagai Pusat Dari Praktik Umat Islam." *Jurnal Living Hadis* 1, no. 1 (2016): 197. <https://doi.org/10.14421/livinghadis.2016.1074>.
- Gāzī, Muḥammad Ibn al-Qāsim al-. *Faḥḥ al-Qarīb al-Mujīb fī Syarḥ AlFāz at-Taqrīb au al-Qaul al-Mukhtār fī Syarḥ Gāyat al-Iḥtiṣār*. Dar Ibn Hazm, 2005.
- Ghazzālī, Abū-Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ibn-Muḥammad al-. *Al- Mankhūl min Ta'liqāt al-Uṣūl*. Ṭab'a 1. Edited by Nāḡī as-Suwaid. Al-Maktaba al- 'Aṣriya, 2008.
- Gomaa, Dr. Ali. "Tartīb Al-Maqāṣid Asy-Syar'iyyah." Paper presented at Abḥāṣ wa Waqa'i' Al-Mu'tamar Al-'Ām Aṣ-Ṣanī wa Al-'Tsyūrīn. Majlis A'lā Lissyu'un Al-Islamī, 2013.
- Halim, Fachrizal A. "Reformulating the Madhhab in Cyberspace." *Islamic Law and Society* 22, no. 4 (2015): 413–35. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685195-00224p04>.
- Hallaq, Wael B. "From Fatwās To Furū: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law." *Islamic Law and Society* 1, no. 1 (1994): 29–65. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156851994X00147>.
- Hallaq, Wael B. "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16, no. 1 (1984): 3–41.
- Hamdeh, Emad. *Salafism and Traditionalism: Scholarly Authority in Modern Islam*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108756594>.
- Ichwan, Moch Nur. "The Making of a Pancasila State: Political Debates on Secularism, Islam and the State in Indonesia." In *SOLAS Research Paper Series*. Sophia Organization for Islamic Area Studies Institute of Asian Cultures, 2012.
- Jum'ah, 'Alī. *Al-Madkhal ilā Dirāsati Al-Maṣāhib Al-Fiqhiyyah*. Dārussalām, 2001.
- Jum'ah, 'Alī. *Aṭ-Ṭariq ilā At-Turāṣ Al-Islamī*. 4th ed. Nahḍat Miṣr, 2009.
- Jum'ah, 'Ālī. *Tāriḥ Uṣūl Al-Fiqh*. Dār Al-Muqattṭam Linnasyri wattawzi', 2015.
- Khan, L. Ali, and Hisham M. Ramadan. *Contemporary Ijtihad Limits and Controversies*. Edinburgh University Press, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748641284.001.0001>.
- Kunhibava, Sherin, Zakariya Mustapha, Aishath Muneeza, Auwal Adam Sa'ad, and Mohammad Ershadul Karim. "Ṣukūk on

- Blockchain: A Legal, Regulatory and Shari'ah Review." *ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance* 13, no. 1 (2021): 118–35. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJIF-06-2020-0120>.
- Layish, Aharon. "Islamic Law in the Modern World: Nationalization, Islamization, Reinstatement." *ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY*, 2021, 33.
- M. Jakfar, Tarmizi, and Arifah Fitria. "Understanding Multiple Interpretations on the Hadith That Husbands Allow Wives to Have Outdoor Activities: A Study of Islamic Law Perspectives." *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Dan Hukum Islam* 5, no. 1 (2021): 210. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v5i1.9106>.
- Mahdi, Muhammad Fakhrol, and Ahmad Yani Anshori. "The Legal Politics of the Aceh Governor's Policy Regarding Religious Activities in Public Sphere: David Easton's Political Theory Perspective." *Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah Dan Hukum* 55, no. 2 (2022): 1. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v56i1.1105>.
- Maimun, M., and Endah Andayani. "Understanding the Connection Between Social Construction and Islamic Values:" Paper presented at 5th Asian Education Symposium 2020 (AES 2020), Bandung, Indonesia. 2021. <https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210715.061>.
- Makdisi, George. "The Juridical Theology of Shafi'i: Origins and Significance of Usul al-Fiqh." *Studia Islamica*, no. 59 (1984): 5. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1595294>.
- Mansyur, Zaenuddin. "Pembaruan Masalah Dalam Maqāsid Al-Shari'ah: Telaah Humanistis Tentang Al-Kulliyāt Al-Khamsah." *Ulumuna* 16, no. 1 (2012): 71–102. <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v16i1.103>.
- Meiloud, Ahmed. "A Conflict Between Divine Texts and Human Legal Needs?" *Islamic Africa* 7, no. 1 (2016): 81–89. <https://doi.org/10.1163/21540993-00701006>.
- Musaffa, Muhamad Ulul Albab, Dakum Dakum, Ahmad Hujaj Nurrohim, and Muhammad Rosyad Sudrajad. "Study the Philosophy of Islamic Law in Determination Percentage of Zakat Mal." *Aẓ-Zarqa': Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam* 14, no. 1 (2022): 19–40. <https://doi.org/10.14421/azzarqa.v14i1.2589>.
- Musaffa, Muhammad Ulul Albab, and Landy Trisna Abdurrahman. "FIKIH PAKAIAN JAMAAH TABLIGH: ANTARA DOKTRIN, IDENTITAS, DAN STRATEGI." *Harmoni* 22,

- no. 1 (2023): 48–69.
<https://doi.org/doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v1i22.642>.
- Najib, Agus Moh. “Reestablishing Indonesian Madhhab: ‘Urf and the Contribution of Intellectualism.” *Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 58, no. 1 (2020): 171–208.
<https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2020.581.171-208>.
- Negadi, Chiheb. “ARCHAEOLOGICAL DOCUMENTATION OF HISTORICAL EVENTS IN THE HOLY QURAN - STORIES OF THE PROPHETS AS A MODEL-.” *RIMAK International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 04, no. 01 (2022): 01–17. <https://doi.org/10.47832/2717-8293.15.1>.
- Oberauer, Norbert. “Canonization in Islamic Law: A Case Study Based on Shāfi’ī Literature.” *Islamic Law and Society* 29, nos. 1–2 (2022): 123–208. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685195-bja10021>.
- Osman, Amr. “The Qur’an and the Hadith as Sources of Islamic Law.” In *Routledge Handbook of Islamic Law*, 1st ed., edited by Khaled Abou El Fadl, Ahmad Atif Ahmad, and Said Fares Hassan. Routledge, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315753881-8>.
- Pendergast, Sara, Tom Pendergast, and Sarah Hermesen. *Fashion, Costume, and Culture: Clothing, Headwear, Body Decorations, and Footwear through the Ages*. UXL, 2003.
- Rakhmatullin, Rafael Yusupovich, Rafis Minegalievich Ziyazetdinov, and Venera Favisovna Yunusbaeva. “Meaning of Sunnah in Islam: Quranism vs Hadithism.” *Manuscript* 14, no. 6 (2021): 1209–12. <https://doi.org/10.30853/mns210195>.
- Rippin, A. “The Function of Asbāb Al-Nuzūl in Qur’ānic Exegesis.” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 51, no. 1 (1988): 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00020188>.
- Rodríguez-Toubes Muñiz, Joaquín. “El Textualismo.” *Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía Del Derecho*, no. 44 (June 2021): 97–123. <https://doi.org/10.7203/CEFD.44.19402>.
- Rosyidi, Imron, and Encep Dulwahab. “Komunikasi Nonverbal Jamaah Tabligh.” *Communicatus: Jurnal Ilmu komunikasi* 1, no. 2 (2019): 71–88. <https://doi.org/10.15575/cjik.v1i2.5023>.
- Saifullah, Ulinnuha. “Commodity Hoarding (Ihtikar) in Surah Al-Hashr: Exploring Historical Roots and Reassessing Interpretative Perspectives.” *Az-Zarqa’: Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam* 15, no. 1 (2023): 43–61.

- Sopyan, Yayan, and Syamsuddin. "Sulūk al-Qāḍī: Muqāranah Bayna Mafhūm al-māwardī Fī Kitāb adab al-Qāḍī wa Qawā'id Sulūk al-Qaḍa Fī Indūnīsiyā." *AHKAM* 21, no. 2 (2021): 445–70. <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v21i2.19671>.
- Sulaiman Jamrozi, Ahmad Syafī'i, Suad Fikriawan, Syamsul Anwar, and Misnen Ardiansyah. "Maqāṣid Al-Sharīa in The Study of Hadith and Its Implication for The Renewal of Islamic Law: Study on Jasser Auda's Thought." *Justicia Islamica* 19, no. 1 (2022): 74–93. <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v19i1.3269>.
- Yahya, Agusni, and Muslim Zainuddin. "The Interpretation of the Hadith on the Characteristics of Women and Its Implications for Islamic Law." *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Dan Hukum Islam* 5, no. 1 (2021): 276–96. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v5i1.9593>.
- Yildiz, Hacı. "An Evaluation of Suhrawardi's Hadithism in the Context of His Work Awarifu'l-Maarif." *Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no. 57 (September 2022): 173–81. <https://doi.org/10.53568/yyusbed.1169185>.